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Authorizing
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in
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Federal States: South Africa,
Democracy, and the KwaZuluNatal Constitution
JonathanL. Marshfield*
ABSTRACT

Not all federal systems permit their constituent units to
adopt constitutions. This Article considers whether, and under
what circumstances, subnational constitutions tend to
contribute to the volatility or stability of their respective federal
systems. By examining the role that subnational constitutions
played in South Africa's celebrated democratization, this Article
observes that a transitional federal state can increase its
flexibility and adaptability by merely authorizing subnational
constitutions. The Article concludes that federal systems,
particularly those undergoing fundamental change, can be
better equipped to manage regime-threatening conflicts and
perpetuate a democratic political culture if they permit
constituent units to adopt constitutions.
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AUTHORIZING SUBNA TIONAL CONSTITUTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
To make peace with an enemy one must work with that enemy, and
that enemy becomes one's partner.
-Nelson Mandela

1

Scholars of subnational constitutional law tend to focus on the
significance of subnational constitutions as independent sources of
law. 2
In the United States of America, for example, state
constitutions are frequently celebrated as an alternative source of
justiciable substantive rights.3 Comparative studies also emphasize

1.
NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM 533 (1994) (referring to
Nelson Mandela's relationship with the last apartheid-era president, F.W. de Klerkparticularly with respect to their shared receipt of the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize).
See, e.g., Ronald Watts, Provinces, States, Ldnder and Cantons: Content
2.
and Variations Among Subnational Constitutions of the World, in SUBNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE 11, 11 (1999) (offering a survey of the legal status of
subnational constitutions in South Africa, the United States of America, Switzerland,
and Germany); James A. Thomson, State Constitutional Law: Some Comparative
Perspectives, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 1059, 1059-61 (1989) (emphasizing the need for
comparative study of subnational constitutions across various federal systems).
3.
See, e.g., Stewart G. Pollock, Assoc. J., Sup. Ct. N.J., State Constitutions as
Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, Address at the S.I. Newhouse Center for
Law and Justice in Newark, N.J. (Apr. 27, 1983), in 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 710-13
(1983) (discussing three theories of state constitutional interpretation in view of the
Justice
relationship between state constitutions and the Federal Constitution).
Brennan is widely credited with the "rediscovery" of broader state protections for
individual rights, which has come to be known as the "new judicial federalism." See
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977) ("[O]ne of the strengths of our federal system is that it
provides a double source of protection for the rights of our citizens."); William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548-53 (1986) (expanding on
same observations); see also G. Alan Tarr, The New JudicialFederalism in Perspective,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1097, 1099-1106 (1997) (providing a historical account of the
For a quintessential example of Justice Brennan's
new judicial federalism).
observations, see Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401-02 (Alaska 1970),
where the Alaska Supreme Court held that the Alaska Constitution guarantees a
broader right to trial-by-jury than the Federal Constitution. In that case, the Supreme
Court of Alaska forcefully and eloquently stated:
While we must enforce the minimum constitutional standards imposed upon us
by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, we are free, and we are under a duty, to develop additional
constitutional rights and privileges under our Alaska Constitution if we find
such fundamental rights and privileges to be within the intention and spirit of
our local constitutional language and to be necessary for the kind of civilized
life and ordered liberty which is at the core of our constitutional heritage. We
need not stand by idly and passively, waiting for constitutional direction from
the highest court of the land. Instead, we should be moving concurrently to
develop and expound the principles embedded in our constitutional law.
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the substantive content of subnational constitutions, 4 usually
focusing on obscure asymmetries between subnational units 5 or
unique distributions of power between central and regional
government. 6 That perspective is important. It is primarily a legal
inquiry, however, aimed at drawing attention to subnational
7
constitutions as alterative sources of law.
Curiously, scholars have largely ignored the threshold question
of whether particular federal systems should or should not authorize
subnational constitutions. Despite the variety of arrangements that
exist regarding the authority of subnational units to adopt
constitutions, 8 few studies have investigated the circumstances under
which those arrangements contribute to the stability or volatility of
their respective federations.

4.
E.g., Robert F. Williams, Comparative Subnational Constitutional Law:
South Africa's Provincial Constitutional Experiments, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 625, 650-51
(1999), reprinted at 63 J. OF CONTEMPORARY ROMAN DUTCH L. 367, 385-86 (2000)
(arguing for the possibility that provincial constitutions in South Africa may provide
greater substantive protections than South Africa's National Constitution); Robert F.
Williams & G. Alan Tarr, Subnational Constitutional Space: A View From the States,
SUBNATIONAL
Provinces, Regions, Lander and Cantons, in FEDERALISM,
CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS 3 (G. Alan Tarr et al. eds., 2004) (analyzing the

substantive legal space afforded subnational constitutions in different federal systems).
E.g., Robert Agranoff, Asymmetrical and Symmetrical Federalism in Spain:
5.
An Examination of Intergovernmental Policy, in EVALUATING FEDERAL SYSTEMS 61
(Bertus de Villiers ed., 1994) (evaluating the asymmetrical structural arrangements in
Spain).
6.
E.g., Ronald L. Watts, States, Provinces, Landers, and Cantons:
International Variety Among Subnational Constitutions, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 941 (2000)
(examining the various structural arrangements in which subnational constitutions
tend to appear).
7.
E.g., Peter E. Quint, The ConstitutionalGuaranteesof Social Welfare in the
Process of German Unification, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 310-21, 325 (1999) (surveying
the developing judicial interpretations of Germany's subnational constitutions on the
issue of social welfare); Watts, supra note 6, at 953-58 (surveying the diversity of
substantive provisions that appear in subnational constitutions and specifically noting
that within South Africa's system the provinces are permitted to draft constitutions
that recognize a traditional monarch).
India's federal arrangement, for example, devolves significant substantive
8.
powers to its constituent states but prohibits the states from adopting constitutions.
See INDIA CONST. arts. 3, 168-212 (describing the competence of India's states and the
authority of the federal government to abolish states or remove their governments); see
also Daniel J. Elazar, State Constitutional Design in the United States and Other
Federal Systems, 12 PUBLIUS J. FEDERALISM, no. 1, at 1, 9 (1982) (describing India's
structural arrangement). Conversely, the United States of America has required states
to adopt constitutions before admitting them into the Union. See U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 3, cl. 1 (authorizing Congress to admit new states into the Union); Julien C. Monnet,
Violations by a State of the Conditions of Its Enabling Act, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 591
(1910) (discussing Congress's constitutional requirements for applicant states). South
Africa's federal system presents an interesting variation on those two extremes
because it permits, but does not require, provinces to adopt constitutions. S. AFR.
CONST. 1996 § 142.
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Nevertheless, South Africa's remarkable transition from
apartheid to democracy suggests that federal systems, particularly
those experiencing fundamental political change, can benefit from
merely authorizing subnational constitutions.
Subnational
constitutions are, at best, a nominal source of substantive law in
South Africa. 9 Indeed, only one of the nine provinces, the Western
Cape, has successfully adopted a constitution, and its content was
rather unremarkable.' 0 However, since 1993, South Africa's various
constitutional arrangements have permitted the provinces to adopt
constitutions.
In accordance with that allocance, the province of KwaZuluNatal (KZN) produced an extravagant draft-constitution during
South Africa's national constitutional negotiations in 1996.11
Although the constitution itself never became operative law, 12 the
KZN constitution-making process was instrumental in South Africa's
successful transition to democracy because it played an essential role
in dissolving the regime-threatening conflict between the Inkatha
1
Freedom Party (IFP) and the African National Congress (ANC). 3
Further, the availability of subnational constitutions within South

9.
See infra Part II (discussing South Africa's constitutional structure and the
limited significance of provincial constitutions therein). See generally Stuart Woolman,
Provincial Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 21-i (Stuart
Woolman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006) (discussing the legal status of provincial constitutions
within South Africa's structural framework and concluding that provincial
constitutions "will never amount to more than window dressing"). Nevertheless,
provincial constitutions were a highly controversial issue during South Africa's
transformation, and their availability, rather than their substance, proved useful
during the transition. See Dirk Brand, The Western Cape Constitution, 31 RUTGERS
L.J. 961, 961 (2000) (discussing the debate over whether provinces should have their
own constitutions).
10.
See infra Part II.B (discussing the Western Cape Constitution); see also
Brand, supra note 9, at 961 (discussing the Western Cape Constitution's content and
the attendant drafting process). The other eight provinces operate under the "default"
provisions of the National Constitution. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 §§ 104-141.
11.
See infra Part IV (discussing the 1996 KZN Constitution).
12.
See infra Part IV; see also infra Part II (describing the procedures for
adopting a provincial constitution). Although the KZN parliament approved the draft
constitution, South Africa's National Constitution requires that provincial texts be
certified by the Constitutional Court before they become operative. S. AFR. CONST.
1996 § 144. Because various portions of the KZN document usurped national powers,
the Constitutional Court declined to certify the text. In re Certificationof the Const. of
the Prov. of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN Certification), 1996 (11) BCLR 1419 (CC) at 54-55
(S. Afr.).
13.
See Suzanne Daley, South African Democracy Stumbles on Old Rivalry,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1996; BRONWEN MANBY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "TRADITIONAL"
DICTATORSHIP-ONE PARTY STATE IN KWAZULu HOMELAND THREATENS TRANSITION TO

DEMOCRACY (Sept. 1993), available at http://hrw.org/reports/1993/southafrica2/#6
[hereinafter TRADITIONAL DICTATORSHIP]; see also infra Part III (discussing the nature
and significance of the conflict between the ANC and the IFP). See generally ANTHEA
JEFFERY, THE NATAL STORY: 16 YEARS OF CONFLICT 213-676 (1997) (documenting, in
detail, the low grade civil war between the ANC and the IFP).
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Africa's federal system proved to be a vital bargaining tool during the
delicately negotiated transition to democracy.
The South African narrative reveals that the availability of
subnational constitutions can dramatically affect a federal system's
flexibility and adaptability. Specifically, federal states that authorize
subnational constitutions can increase the array of political
compromises available to disputing parties and can accommodate
various layers of constructive political interaction. That increased
elasticity and utility can be particularly valuable for a transitional
federal state, where successful regime change often depends on the
system's ability to institutionalize regime-threatening conflicts and
assimilate marginalized factions. In short, South Africa's experience
illustrates that transitional federal systems are better equipped to
manage regime-threatening conflicts 14 and perpetuate a democratic
political culture 15 if they permit constituent units to adopt
constitutions.
This Article examines South Africa's federal structure and the
role that subnational constitutions played in successfully managing
the infamous conflict between the IFP and the ANC. Part II is a brief
legal analysis of South Africa's constitutional framework with an
emphasis on the nominal importance of subnational constitutions as
sources of law. Part III provides an account of the low-grade civil war
that occurred between the ANC and the IFP-the central conflict that
threatened the country's transition to democracy. Part -V uncovers
the details of the subnational constitution-making that accompanied
the ANC/IFP conflict. Part V considers the ways in which the
availability of subnational constitutions helped to manage the
ANC/IFP conflict and facilitate successful transition at the national
Finally, Part VI discusses the role that subnational
level.
constitution-making played in the political socialization of both the
ANC and the IFP.

II.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF PROVINCIAL CONSTITUTIONS IN
SOUTH AFRICA

1993

South Africa's current structural framework originated with the
The IC demarcated nine
Interim Constitution (IC).1 6

14.
See discussion infra Part V.
15.
See discussion infra Part I.
16.
The IC was negotiated between the South African government and a
coalition of liberation organizations-the most significant of which was the ANC. The
IC established a bicameral legislature consisting of the National Assembly and the
Senate. S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 § 36; see also LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY
OF SOUTH AFRICA 257-58 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing the content and nature of the IC).
The IC also created the Constitutional Assembly, which was a unique body that
consisted of both chambers sitting jointly for the purpose of drafting the permanent
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subnational units, termed provinces, 17 and established executive1 8
and legislative i9 branches in each province. It also authorized the
provinces to adopt their own constitutions by a two-thirds majority of
the provincial legislature. 20 However, the provinces were designed to
function effectively without constitutions and the IC provided "full
particulars" on all necessary provincial government institutions. 21 In
1996, the National Constitution (NC) replaced the IC 2 2 and, with
23
minor exceptions, reaffirmed the IC's constitutional structure.
"4

A. The Provinces'Limited "ConstitutionalSpace'

South Africa is a devolutionary federal system.2 5 A unitary state
theoretically preceded any subnational units, and that state

national constitution. S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 § 68; see also I.M. RAUTENBACH &
E.F.J. MALHERBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18 (4th ed. 2004) (providing a concise
summary of the legal arrangements during the transition to democracy); Jeremy
Sarkin, The Drafting of South Africa's Final Constitution from a Human-Rights
Perspective, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 69-77 (1999) (providing a thorough review of the
drafting process). See generally Daisy M. Jenkins, From Apartheid to Majority Rule: A
Glimpse Into South Africa's Journey Towards Democracy, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
463, 479-83 (1996) (discussing the general history and structure of the IC).
For an exhaustive review of subnational constitutions throughout South Africa's
history and a legal analysis of South Africa's current structural framework, see Rassie
Malherbe & Dirk Brand, South Africa: Sub-National Constitutional Law, in
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS, CONSTITUIONAL LAW, SUB-NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1, at 1, 13-23, 75-116 (Andr6 Alen et al. eds., 2001).
17.
S.AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 § 124(1).
18.
Id. § 144(1).
19.
Id. § 125(1).
20.
Id. § 160.
21.
RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 16, at 244 & n.22; see In re
Certificationof the Const. of the Western Cape 1997 (9) BCLR 1167 (CC) at 24 (S.Afr.)
("[The National Constitution] provides a complete blueprint for the regulation of
government within provinces which provides adequately for the establishment and
functioning of provincial legislatures and executives.").
22.
In re Certificationof the Amended Text of the Const. of the Republic of S.
Afr., 1997 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) para. 205 (S.Mr.). The permanent National Constitution
became effective on February 4, 1996. See RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 16,
at 18 (discussing the legal relationship between the IC and the NC).
23.
See RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 16, at 241-72 (providing a legal
analysis of South Africa's current structural framework in respect of provincial
government and constitutional competence).
24.
The term "provincial constitutional space" is intended to adopt the concept
of "subnational constitutional space" as developed in Williams & Tarr, supra note 4, at
15-16. In that article, the term "subnational constitutional space" refers to the
substantive competency of subnational units within their respective federal systems.
Id. That is, the substantive areas that subnational polities have the authority to
include in their constitutions.
25.
Scholars frequently refer to two models of federal systems: integrative
federalism and devolutionary federalism. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 4, at 640
(setting forth Koen Lenaerts' description of the two models). Koen Lenaerts has
distinguished those two models as follows:
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subsequently instituted the provinces. 26 The provinces are creatures
of the national government and have only those powers specifically
conferred on them by the NC. 2 7 Thus, the constitutional competency
of the provinces is limited to the NC's express delegation of
authority. 28 Stated differently, provincial "constitutional space" is
circumscribed rather than plenary.
To ensure that provincial constitutions do not contain ultra vires
content, they must be certified by the national Constitutional Court
(Court) before they can become law. 29 Certification involves a twostep legal analysis. First, the Court evaluates every provision to
ensure that the entire document is within one of the enumerated
provincial competencies. 30 Second, the Court must certify that no
31
provision is inconsistent with any provision of the NC.
There are three provincial constitutional competencies. 32 First, a
provincial constitution may include any provision that would fall

Integrative federalism refers to a constitutional order that strives at unity in
diversity among previously independent or confederally related component
entities. The goal of establishing an effective central government with direct
operation on the people inside its sphere of powers is pursued under respect of
the powers of the component entities, at least to the extent that the use by the
latter of these powers does not revert into divisiveness ....
Devolutionary federalism, on the contrary, refers to a constitutional order
that redistributes the powers of a previously unitary State among its
component entities; these entities obtain an autonomous status within their
fields of responsibility. The principal concern is to organize diversity in unity.
Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalismand the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP.
L. 205, 206 (1990).
26.
Indeed, Section 1 of the NC declares that "[t]he Republic of South Africa is
one, sovereign, democratic state." S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 1. In In re Certificationof the
Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the Constitutional
Court stated: "In the result, what is contemplated by [the NC] is not a provincial
constitution suitable to an independent or confederal state but one dealing with the
governance of a province whose powers are derived from the NC." 1997 (1) BCLR 1
(CC) para. 350 (S. Afr.). Thus, it is clear that South Africa's federal system is
devolutionary in nature.
27.
See KZN Certification, 1996 (11) BCLR 1419 (CC) at 23 (S. Ar.) ("It is
clearly beyond the capacity of a provincial legislature to pass constitutional provisions
concerning the status of a province within the Republic. After all, the provinces are the
recipients and not the source of power.").
28.
Id.; see also Malherbe & Brand, supra note 16, at 65-67 (examining the
status of the provinces within South Africa's constitutional order).
29.
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 144. The permanent NC was subject to a similar
certification process. In re Certification of the Amended Text of the Const. of the
Republic of S. Afr, (1) BCLR 1 para. 1.
30.
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 143(2)(b).
31.
Id. § 143(1); see also KZN Certification, (11) BCLR 1419 at 17-18
(articulating the certification analysis); RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 16, at
245 (same).
32.
See RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 16, at 244-47 (discussing
provincial constitutional competencies); Malherbe & Brand, supra note 16, at 86-88
(same); Woolman, supra note 9, at 21-5 to -14 (same).
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within the province's legislative authority. 33 Second, a provincial
constitution may establish "executive and legislative structures and
34
procedures" that differ from the default provisions of the NC.
Finally, provincial constitutions may provide for "the institution, role,
'35
authority and status of a traditional monarch.
Provincial government's legislative authority is defined in
Schedules 4 and 5 of the NC. Schedule 4 lists areas of concurrent
national and provincial legislative competence, with the most notable
being traditional leadership, trade, tourism, housing, and
education. 36 Schedule 5 lists twelve rather insignificant areas of
exclusive provincial competency. 37 Thus, because the provinces can
legislate in respect of traditional leadership under Schedule 4,
government structure and procedure is the only constitutional
competence that is not also within a province's legislative authority.
That overlap between constitutional and legislative competency
is significant because of the NC's conflict of law rules. The NC
provides specific rules with respect to how conflicts between national

33.
That competency is implied by Section 143 of South Africa's Constitution,
which prohibits provincial constitutions from enlarging the substantive competencies of
the provinces beyond those enumerated in Section 104. S.AFR. CONST. 1996 §§ 104,
143. Furthermore, the Court stated in KZN Certificationthat
[f]or purposes of section [1431 there is a different and perhaps even more
fundamental inconsistency, namely where the provincial legislature purports to
embody in its constitution, whether in its bill of rights or elsewhere, matters in
respect whereof it has no power to legislate pursuant to the provisions of
section 126 or any other provision of the interim Constitution.
KZN Certification, (11) BCLR 1419 at 31. Commentators have also assumed that
provincial constitutions may contain any provision that would be within the province's
legislative authority. See Woolman, supra note 9, at 21-9 to -10.
34.
S.AFR. CONST. 1996 § 143(1)(a); see also KZN Certification,(11) BCLR 1419
at 15 (discussing the "limits" of structure and procedure); Woolman, supra note 9, at
21-11 to -12 (same).
35.
S.AFR. CONST. 1996 § 143(1)(b).
36.
See RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 16, at 246-50 (discussing the
legislative competencies of the provinces).
37.
Those areas include maintenance of roads, registration of animals, public
cleaning services, maintenance of parks, and other similar competencies. S. AFR.
CONST. 1996 sched. 5, pt. A. The province's exclusive competency is not unqualified.
Under Section 44(2) of the South Africa Constitution, the national government may
legislate on areas enumerated in Schedule 5 when "necessary":
a.

to maintain national security;

b.

to maintain economic unity;

c.

to maintain essential national standards;

d.

to establish minimum standards required for the rendering of services; or

e.

to prevent unreasonable action taken by a province which is prejudicial to
the interests of another province or to the country as a whole.

Id. § 44(2).
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and provincial laws should be resolved, 38 with national law
superseding provincial law in almost all situations. 39 Section 147
equates provincial constitutions with provincial legislation for
40
purposes of resolving conflicts between national and provincial law.
Section 147, however, does not implicate provisions relating to
government structure and procedure. 41 With that one exception,
therefore, provincial constitutions are no more insulated from
national preemption than provincial legislation, and the bounds of a
province's constitutionalspace are dependant largely on the existence
42
of preemptory national legislation.
An additional, and perhaps more significant, limitation on the
competency of the provinces is their ability to tax.4 3 Under Chapter 3
of the NC, provinces are precluded from assessing any sales,

38.
Id. §§ 146-150.
39.
See Woolman, supra note 9, at 21-18 to -19. Under the conflict-of-law
provisions, national legislation prevails if the matter being regulated cannot be
regulated effectively at the regional level or if it is more efficient to regulate the matter
nationally. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 146(2).
40.
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 147.
41.
Indeed, in Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v Electoral
Commission, the Court held that actions taken by the Western Cape were not
invalidated by conflicting national legislation. 1999 (11) BCLR 1209 (CC) at 9 (S. Mr.).
In that case, the Western Cape Constitution had enlarged the number of legislative
seats in the provincial legislature. Id. at 3-4. The Court held those provisions to be
valid notwithstanding national legislation to the contrary. Id. at 3, 8-9. The power to
constitutionalize structure and procedure is not without substantive significance. An
interesting question is whether the Court would certify a provision that increases the
majority necessary to amend a provincial constitution. A creative provincial legislature
could increase the majority required to amend a provincial constitution above the
minimum two-thirds established by the NC. Because a constitution can contain any
provision relating to the legislative competencies, a provincial legislature could
insulate certain legislative actions from future alteration by placing them in the
constitution. Indeed, the Western Cape Constitution contains a list of "Directive
Principles of Provincial Policy." Brand, supra note 9, at 970. Those principles are
intended to be used by the provincial government as "a point of reference to determine
their policy objectives and priorities." Id. It has also been suggested that the Court
would consider those principles as an interpretive tool in evaluating provincial
executive or legislative action. Id. Thus, one provincial legislature could arguably
constitutionalize its policies for compliance by subsequent legislatures and increase the
majority necessary to amend those policies.
42.
The provinces have litigated to protect their legislative competence from
national encroachment but have been unsuccessful. In National Gambling Board v
Premier of KwaZulu-Natal, KZN brought suit because of national legislation that
conflicted with provincial legislation, which was enacted pursuant to Schedule 4. 2002
(2) BCLR 156 at 11 (CC). The Court ruled that KZN had a constitutional obligation to
co-operate with national legislation and promulgate compatible provincial regulations.
Id. at 28-30. In In re The National Education Policy Bill, the Court held that national
legislation regulating education prevailed notwithstanding the province's concurrent
authority to regulate education under Schedule 4. 1996 (4) BCLR 518 (CC) at 36-37

(S. Mr.).
43.
See Malherbe & Brand, supra note 16, at 57 (discussing the taxing powers
of the provinces). The provinces may issue debt, however, subject to regulation by the
national legislature. Id.
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property, income, or value-added tax.44 The provinces, however, are
45
entitled to an equitable share of the national tax revenue.
Distribution of the equitable share is determined by national
legislation. 46 The NC provides that the equitable share must be
sufficient for the provinces to provide "basic services" and perform the
functions allocated to them under national law. 47 Thus, the provinces
are not entitled to additional funding for expenses created by
provincial law, and their ability to raise independent revenue is
48
severely limited.
B. The Western Cape Constitution
Only one of the nine provinces, the Western Cape, has
successfully adopted a constitution. The Western Cape Constitution
was originally passed by the Western Cape Parliament in February
199749 and was submitted to the Court for certification in September
of that year. 50 In its judgment, the Court noted that the legislature
51
had adopted the constitution in accordance with the NC's strictures.
However, the Court refused to certify the constitution because it
52
contained ultra vires content.
Specifically, the Western Cape Constitution purported to alter
the electoral system.5 3 It divided the Western Cape into various

44.
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 228(1)(a).
45.
Id. § 227(1)(a).
46.
Id. § 214; see also Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act 97 of 1997
(implementing the directives of S. AFR. CONST. 1996. § 214). Not surprisingly, the
"equitable share" has become the primary source of revenue for the provinces. See
David Pottie, Provincial Government in South Africa Since 1994, in PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 38, 45 (2000), available at http://www.kas.de/db-files/
dokumente/7_dokument dok -.pdf 4883_.2.pdf (evaluating the financial sustainability of
the provinces); Richard Simeon, Considerations on the Design of Federations: The
South African Constitution in Comparative Context 14-15 (Univ. of Toronto, Working
Paper 1998 (2)), available at http://www.iigr.ca/pdf/publications/145_Considerations
_on the De.pdf (discussing the province's financial limitations).
47.
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 227(1)(a).
48.
See id. § 228(2).
49.
Brand, supra note 9, at 966.
50.
See In re Certificationof the Const. of the Western Cape 1997 (9) BCLR 1167
(CC) at 10 (S. Mr.); Brand, supra note 9, at 966-67 (discussing the Court's initial
judgment).
51.
In re Certification of the Const. of the Western Cape (9) BCLR 1167 at 10
("The legislature of the province of the Western Cape duly adopted a constitutional text
in accordance with section 142 of the Constitution and its Speaker, as required by
section 144(1), submitted the text to this Court for certification that it complies with
section 143.").
52.
Id. at 55-58.
53.
See Brand, supra note 9, at 966-67 (discussing this element of the Western
Cape Constitution); Malherbe & Brand, supra note 16, at 99-100 (same); Woolman,
supra note 9, at 21-17 (same). The Court identified three elements of the Western
Cape Constitution that could not be certified. See Malherbe & Brand, supra note 16, at
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geographic regions and allocated provincial parliamentary seats to
each region based on population. 5 4 That system was clearly at odds
with national law, which allocated provincial parliamentary seats
55
based on the popular vote of the province's entire constituency.
The Western Cape argued that a provincial constitution can alter
the electoral system because, under the NC, the provinces can provide
for "structures and procedures" that differ from the NC's default
provisions. 56 The Court rejected that argument and held that
"structures and procedures" does not encompass provisions that alter
57
"the fundamental nature and substance of the democratic state."
Nevertheless, the Western Cape Parliament amended the
constitution to comply with the Court's ruling,5 8 and the Court
subsequently certified the amended draft.5 9 The Western Cape
Constitution became operative on January 16, 1998.60
C. Individual Rights and Provincial Constitutions
Some commentators suggest that provincial constitutions may
develop into an additional source of legally enforceable individual
rights. 61 Indeed, the 1996 KZN draft constitution contained an
extravagant bill of rights. 6 2 Although the Court refused to certify the
1996 KZN bill of rights, 63 the Court nevertheless stated in its
judgment:
A provincial bill of rights could (in respect of matters falling within the
province's powers) place greater limitations on the province's powers or
confer greater rights on individuals than does the [National]

98. However, the document's fatal flaw was its modification of the electoral system.
Id.
54.
Brand, supra note 9, at 967.
55.
See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 105 (describing the election of provincial
representatives).
56.
Brand, supranote 9, at 966-67; Malherbe & Brand, supra note 16, at 99.
57.
The court also noted:
We would emphasise [sic], however, that whatever meaning is ascribed to
"structures and procedures," they do not relate to the fundamental nature and
substance of the democratic state created by the interim Constitution nor to the
substance of the legislative or executive powers of the national Parliament or
Government or those of the provinces.
In re Certificationof the Const. of the Western Cape (9) BCLR 1167 at 19 (quoting KZN
Certification1996 (11) BCLR 1419 (CC) at 15 (S. Afr.)).
58.
Brand, supra note 9, at 966.
59.
See Certificationof the Amended Text of the Const. of the Western Cape 1997
(12) BCLR 1653 (CC) at 4-5 (S. Mr.).
60.
Brand, supra note 9, at 966.
61.
Williams, supra note 4, at 650-62.
62.
See KZN Certification(11) BCLR 1419 at 35-40 (analyzing the provisions of
the bill of rights).
63.
Id. at 39-42.
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Constitution, and it could even confer rights on individuals which do
64
not exist in the [National] Constitution.

However, the Court reiterated that a provincial bill of rights must not
be "inconsistent" with the NC 65 and "cannot operate in respect of
matters which fall outside of its legislative or executive
competence." 66 The Court also noted that certification of a provincial
bill of rights requires the additional consideration of whether the
provincial right "has the effect of eliminating or limiting a right
'67
protected in the [National] Constitution.
Thus, a provincial bill of rights can operate only within areas
that are not already addressed by the NC's bill of rights or preempted
by national legislation. In view of the NC's exhaustive list of
individual protections and the ever-growing body of national
legislation, there appears to be little remaining "space" for
meaningful provincial rights. 68 Furthermore, although theoretical
possibilities do exist, 69 provincial constitutions do not currently

64.

Id. at 30-31.

65.

Id. at 31.

66.
Id. at 27.
67.
Id. at 33. That analysis is interesting when compared against the state
action requirement associated with the Federal Bill of Rights in the United States. See
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (deciding validity of racially-based,
restrictive covenants on other grounds but stating, "the principle has become firmly
embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited ... is only such action as
may fairly be said to be that of the States."). In contrast, South Africa's NC provides
protections that are not dependant on state action to be enforceable. See S. AFR.
CONST. 1996 § 8(2) ("A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic
person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the
right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right."); id. § 9(4) ("No person may
unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone.").
See generally
RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 16, at 310-14 (discussing application of South
Africa's Bill of Rights against private individuals). Thus, there exists the possibility
that a provincial right, when exercised by an individual, could infringe a national
constitutional right of another individual. The absence of a state action requirement in
those situations creates a legal conflict between the two individuals who both claim
valid legal rights. The Court therefore articulated a test to resolve such conflicts.
According to the Court, two rights provisions "are inconsistent when they cannot stand
at the same time, or cannot stand together, or cannot both be obeyed at the same time."
KZN Certification (11) BCLR 1419 at 32. In those cases, the provincial right must
yield to the national right. Id. at 35-36.
68.
Indeed, in KZN Certification, the Court stated, "In view of the
comprehensive nature of the rights in Chapter 3 of the [IC] it may transpire that the
ambit of a provincial bill of rights is a very limited one, but this is not a matter on
which we are called upon to express any view at this stage." KZN Certification (11)
BCLR 1419 at 33-34; accord Woolman, supra note 9, at 21-2 n.2 (responding to the
suggestion that provincial constitutions may develop into significant sources of
individual rights).
69.
Commentators point to creative ways that provincial constitutions still can
strengthen individual liberties.
Under the test established in the 1996 KZN
Certification case, a provincial right is invalid if it simultaneously restricts a right
contained in the national bill of rights. However, a provincial right may be valid if
enforced only against the government because there is no concomitant infringement of
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provide any additional protections. The Western Cape and KZN are
the only provinces to have enacted constitutions. 70 As already noted,
however, the Court refused to certify the KZN constitution, 71 and
KZN still operates under the NC's default provisions. The Western
Cape Constitution was certified in 199772 but does not contain a bill of
rights.7 3 That constitution, however, did vary from the NC's default
provisions by increasing the number of provincial parliamentary
seats from thirty-nine to forty-two, 74 and the Court has subsequently
upheld that variation notwithstanding
conflicting
national
legislation. 75
That minor aberration appears to be the only
substantive contribution of the Western Cape Constitution because
the remainder of the document essentially mirrors the NC.7 6 No
other provinces besides the Western Cape and KZN have attempted
to draft a constitution.

an individual liberty. See Anna Annandale et al., Analysis of Constitutional Proposals
for the Province of Kwa-Zulu-Natal paras. 121-126 (Apr. 15, 2005) (on file with
author). For example, in 2005, the KZN Legislature began drafting another provincial
constitution.
Bheki
ka
Mncube,
Constitutional Showdown,
WITNESS
(Pietermaritzburg, S. Afr.), Jan. 24, 2005. The 2004 IFP draft-constitution contained a
provision that declared, "Every consumer has the right to operate in a market place
[sic] where . . . contractual arrangements . . . are not altered or worsened by . . .

practices in restraint of trade." PROVINCE OF KwAZULu NATAL CONST. (Inkatha
Freedom Party Draft) 2004
§ 8(3),
available at http://www.ifp.org.za/
ConstitutionprovKZNconstitution.htm. However, the NC contains a guarantee that
reasonable restraints of trade are enforceable in contract. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 22.
Thus, the IFP draft purported to confer greater contracting rights to employees, but it
simultaneously limited an employer's right to conclude and enforce such agreements.
See Annandale et al., supra note 69, para. 141 (concluding that such a provision would
not be certified by the Court). If the same provision is applied against only the
government, then that conflict does not arise because the national bill of rights benefits
only natural persons. Id. para. 121. In other words, provinces may enlarge individual
rights "if the bearer of the duties concomitant to that right is the State" and not
another natural person. Id. In that way, a provincial bill of rights could still become a
valuable tool in restricting state action even if it is unenforceable in the private sector.
Id. para. 25. The 2004 KZN draft constitution was short lived, however, and it failed to
receive the majority necessary to leave committee. See KZN Draft not Adopted,
MERCURY (Durban, S. Afr.), June 1, 2005; see also infra note 255 (discussing the 2004
KZN constitutional process more fully).
70.
RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 16, at 245.
71.
KZN Certification(11) BCLR 1419 at 54-56.
72.
Certification of the Amended Text of the Const. of the Western Cape 1997
(12) BCLR 1653 (CC) at 3-4 (S. Afr.).
73.
See Brand, supra note 9, at 970 (recounting the content of the Western
Cape Constitution).
74.
Id. at 967-68.
75.
Premier of the Prov. of the Western Cape v Electoral Comm'n 1999 (11)
BCLR 1209 (CC) at 8-9 (S. Afr.); see supra note 41 (discussing the Electoral
Commission case more fully).
76.
The only other provisions at variation from the NC related to the province's
official language and a set of broad policy directives intended to guide future
legislatures. See Brand, supra note 9, at 969-70 (discussing those provisions); see also
supranote 41 (same).
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In sum, South Africa's structural framework is tilted heavily in
favor of the national government and allocates very little
constitutional space to the provinces. Additionally, as a descriptive
matter, provincial constitutions have not become a significant source
of substantive law. Rather, the provinces are analogous to regional
administrative agencies of the national government 77-delivering
services that are financed primarily by national funds and developing
78
almost no independent constitutional law.

Nevertheless, since 1993, the South African Constitution has
guaranteed the provinces the right to adopt constitutions. That
allowance proved instrumental during South Africa's transition to
democracy because of its influence on the ANC/IFP conflict.

III.

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY AND THE
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

South African history is a paradox. If apartheid was one of the
twentieth century's great evils, the transition to democracy was one
of the great achievements of this century. 79 By the late 1980s, the
ruling Afrikaaners were increasingly aware that change was

77.
The current operation of provincial government is often dictated by
national policies and legislation and limited by the province's inability to raise
independent revenue. See Pottie, supra note 46, at 43-45 (providing a detailed
empirical evaluation of the viability of provincial governments in South Africa);
Simeon, supra note 46, at 15 ("At the moment, there is an enormous mismatch between
revenues and responsibilities-and provinces raise only four percent of their operating
revenue."); see also Minister of Health v Treatment of Action Campaign (2) 2002 (10)
BCLR 1075 (CC) at 2-3 (S. Mr.) (holding that provinces must take reasonable steps to
implement socio-economic rights guaranteed by the national constitution). Further,
under South Africa's party based electoral system, national party leaders nominate
provincial representatives. Pottie, supra note 46, at 45-46. Thus, the provincial
representatives are largely puppets for the broader policy decisions of the national
parties.
78.
See generally TOM LODGE, POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA 33-43 (2002)
(providing a detailed explanation of the fiscal limitations on provincial government
that impact its ability to make substantive law).
79.
See Peter N. Bouckaert, Note, The Negotiated Revolution: South Africa's
Transition to a Multiracial Democracy, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 375, 375 (1997)
(characterizing South Africa's transition to democracy as "one of the greatest political
achievements of this century" because of its relatively peaceful nature). For a
systematic summary of the legal issues associated with the transition to democracy,
see Anthia Jansen van Rensburg, The Government of National Unity (1994-1996): Its
Influence on South African Party Politics, POLITEIA, 2001 no. 2, at 38. See also
Marianne Geula, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an
Alternative Means of Addressing Transitional Government Conflicts in a Divided
Society, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 57, 59-63 (2000) (providing a concisp description of the
transition to democracy).
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inevitable.8 0
On February 2, 1990, President F. W. de Klerk
announced the lifting of all bans on the ANC and other liberation
organizations.8 1 Nine days later, de Klerk released ANC President
82
Nelson Mandela from prison.
Although the Afrikaaners recognized the certain end of
apartheid, there was violent disagreement among the liberation
groups as to the nature of the new constitutional order.8 3 The most
significant conflict was between the IFP, an ethnic-based
organization with strong regional support in KZN,8 4 and the ANC,
the largest and most influential liberation organization with broad
multi-ethnic support.8 5 At the center of the conflict was the future
political identity of the Zulu people.86 The IFP was founded to protect

80.
THOMPSON, supra note 16, 241-47. Apartheid was the product of three
decades of rule by the white Afrikaaners. Id. at 187. The National Party was the
political party responsible for the institution of apartheid when it took power in 1948.
Id.
Over the course of three decades the apartheid regime systematically
disenfranchised black South Africans and committed grave human rights violations.
See generally id. at 187-264 (discussing the history of the apartheid regime from
inception to demise). However, by the late 1980s domestic unrest and international
sanctions had effectively undermined the apartheid regime. Id. at 221, 241-47.
81.
See RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 16, at 17 (describing the 1990
unbanning of the resistance organizations as the turning point in the liberation
movement). The ANC and other political organizations were banned in 1960 after a
series of mass demonstrations. THOMPSON, supranote 16, at 210.
82.
THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 247.
83.
Id. at 247-52; see also Mangasuthu Buthelezi, A Bird's Eye View of the
Historical and Political Divides Between the IFP and the ANC, KwAZULU-NATAL
BRIEFING, 1997, at 6, 15 (Helen Suzman Found., Cape Town, S. Afr.) (articulating the
core divide between the ANC and the IFP as relating to the "post political dynamics of
post-liberation"); Jerome Wilson, Ethnic Groups and the Right to Self-Determination,
11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 433, 449-56 (1996). The ANC itself was deeply divided in 1990
when Nelson Mandela was released from prison. THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 250.
Although united in opposition to apartheid, the 700,000 ANC members came from,
among other backgrounds, the Communist Party, trade unions, and foreign military
service. Id.
84.
Wilson, supra note 83, at 442-43 (describing the significance and nature of
the ANC/IFP conflict); see THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 259 ("[The IFP] probably had
the support of a majority of the Zulu people who, in all, amounted to 22 percent of the
population of South Africa.").
85.
The ANC's support base is best gauged by its success in the 1994 elections
where it received 62.65% of the national popular vote. See THOMPSON, supra note 16,
at 264 (discussing the ANC's constituency and the election results); id. at 259-61
(describing the conflict between the ANC and the IFP as a major threat to the peace
process); Bouckaert, supra note 79, at 409 n.215 (similarly describing this conflict as a
threat to the peace process). See generally JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 213-676
(documenting, in detail, the low-grade civil war between the ANC and the IFP).
86.
See SIBUSISIWE DLAMINI, YOUTH AND IDENTITY POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA
1990-1994, at 83-84 (2005) (describing the IFP and ANC's competing visions of
political identity); Shula Marks, "The Dog That Did Not Bark, or Why Natal Did Not
Take Off" Ethnicity & Democracy in South Africa-KwaZulu-Natal, in ETHNICITY AND
DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 183, 194 (Bruce Berman et al. eds., 2004) ("Increasingly, the
political battle between Inkatha and the ANC ...was framed as an ideological struggle
over what it meant to be 'Zulu."'); Wilson, supra note 83, at 442-49 (providing a
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Zulu culture and tradition,8 7 and its constituency was almost entirely
Zulu.8 8 The ANC, however, was a multi-ethnic organization that
emphasized African nationalism, not ethnic identity.8 9 Violence
between the two organizations, most of which occurred within KZN,
199490 and placed
rose to anarchic proportions between 1990 and
91
South Africa's hopes for democracy in jeopardy.

comprehensive summary of the IFP's ethnic associations and agenda). It is widely
suggested that the IFP did not provide genuine representation of Zulu interests, but
rather, used "Zuluness" as a means of mobilizing a support base. See Wilson, supra
note 83, at 449-56. This school of thought focuses on the dangers of politicizing
ethnicity-the disproportionate power of political elites and the disenfranchised body
politic. Id. However, regardless of the validity of those concerns, there is no dispute
that the issue that divided the ANC and the IFP was one of political identity. Whether
that issue was manufactured by political elites or the result of the people's genuine
concerns is irrelevant to this Article's observation that a violent conflict existed and
threatened the transition to democracy.
DLAMINI, supra note 86, at 54-55 (providing a concise history of the IFP).
87.
Id.
88.
See id. at 84 ("Operating alongside this Inkatha Zulu identity was the ANC
89.
version of a non-racial/ethnic democratic South Africa."); see also MANDELA, supra note
1, at 87 ("[O]ur creed was the creation of one nation out of many tribes, the overthrow
of white supremacy, and the establishment of a truly democratic form of government.");
Buthelezi, supra note 83, at 14-18 (providing the IFP's perspective on the division);
The Clash that had to Come: African Nationalism and the "Problem" of Traditional
Authority, KWAZULU-NATAL BRIEFING, 1996, at 11 (Helen Suzman Found., Cape Town,
S. Afr.) [hereinafter The Clash that had to Come] (providing a detailed description of
the IFP and ANC's competing visions of ethnicity in the new constitutional order). On
February 25, 1990, Nelson Mandela gave a historic speech in the city of Durban that
outlined the essential difference between the ANC and the IFP. See Nelson Mandela,
President, African Nat'l Cong., Address to Rally in Durban (Feb. 25, 1990), available at
Additionally,
http://www.anc.org.zalancdocs/ history/mandela/1990/sp900225-1.html.
the ANC's most famous and influential declaration of its identity occurred in 1955, in
The Freedom Charter. The Freedom Charter, Adopted at the Congress of the People,
Kliptown, June 26, 1955, available at http://www.anc.org.zalancdocslhistory
charter.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2008); see also MANDELA, supra note 1, at 151-53
(discussing and reprinting portions of The Freedom Charter); Mark S. Kende, The
South African Constitutional Court's Construction of Socio-Economic Rights: A
Response to Critics, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 617, 625-26 (2004) (discussing the significance
of The Freedom Charter).
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 1-2; see also Bouckaert, supra note 79, at 409
90.
n.215. See generally JEFFERY, supra note 13 (providing a definitive treatise on the
"strife province" and the KZN conflict, consisting of almost one-thousand pages
documenting the details of political violence between the ANC and the IFP).
91.
See TRADITIONAL DICTATORSHIP, supra note 13; Daley, supra note 13;
Bouckaert, supra note 79, at 409 n.215. Adding to the rift between the parties during
this period were confirmed suspicions that the government had been covertly funding
and training IFP militants. COURTNEY JUNG, THEN I WAS BLACK: SOUTH AFRICAN
POLITICAL IDENTITIES IN TRANSITION 76 (2000). Those suspicions were later confirmed

by the Goldstone Commission and served to bolster the ANC's position that the IFP
had been compromised as a liberation organization and had become a tool in the
government's divide and conquer tactics. See id. at 76-77; Bouckaert, supra note 79, at
409 n.215.
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A. The HistoricalDivision between the ANC and the IFP
In the mid-nineteenth century, the British created the "native
reserve" of Zululand. 9 2
Zululand was comprised of various
noncontiguous territories within the larger region of Natal.93 Under
apartheid, the Afrikaaner government incorporated many of the
British reserves into "Bantu Homelands. '94
The Afrikaaners
intended the Homelands to become, at least in theory, independent
states within the territories of South Africa. 95
In 1951, the
government established "KwaZulu" as a homeland for the Zulu
people, 96 and in 1971, KwaZulu was recognized as a "self-governing
territory" under the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act.9 7 The
KwaZulu Legislative Assembly was established in 1972, and
KwaZulu was granted further powers of self-government in 1977.98
1.

The IFP's Genesis as an Ethnic Organization

The IFP was originally created because of the balkanization of
Zululand. In 1920, Zulu King Solomon kaDinizulu established an
organization known simply as "Inkatha."99 The King's vision was to
counteract British fragmentation of Zululand by preserving Zulu
culture and tradition. 100 That organization collapsed after a few
years but was revived in 1975 as "Inkatha YaKwaZulu" by Zulu Chief

92.
Wilson, supranote 83, at 447.
93.
Id. at 444-45.
94.
See Catherine M. Coles, Land Reform for Post-Apartheid South Africa, 20
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 699, 716-18 (1993) (tracing the various legislation that
established the homelands).
95.
The Homelands were part of the government's strategy to disenfranchise
black South Africans. Id. The government created the Homelands for the purpose of
stripping Africans of their South African citizenship. See id. The Bantu Citizenship
Act 26 of 1970 required all black South Africans to become citizens of one of the
homelands. Id.; see also THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 190-92 (discussing the
government's strategy of disenfranchisement).
96.
Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951; see THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 191
(discussing the government's division of territories into "homelands"). KwaZulu was
inhabited predominantly by the Zulu people and was by far the largest and most
homogenous of the apartheid-era homelands. THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 191. The
province of Natal, however, was home to significant numbers of European and Indian
South Africans. Id. at 96-100.
97.
TRADITIONAL DICTATORSHIP, supra note 13.
98.
Id.
99.
Id.; see also Kenneth D. Kaunda, The First Shall Be the Last: The African
National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party Dispute, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 841,
845 (1993) (discussing the history of the IFP). "Inkatha" is the name of a traditional
Zulu headband. Kaunda, supra note 99, at 845. Multiple pieces of straw and grass are
woven together into a circular band. Id. The headband is used to support heavy loads
traditionally carried on the head. Id. Strength in unity is the obvious symbolism of the
headband. Id.
100.
TRADITIONAL DICTATORSHIP, supra note 13.
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Mangosuthu Buthelezi. 1° 1
The stated purpose of the new
organization was to "promote and encourage the development of the
people of KwaZulu, spiritually, economically, educationally and
politically." 10 2 Even under Chief Buthelezi, however, membership
was initially limited to Zulus, 10 3 and the IFP represented the
"political embodiment of Zuluness.' 10 4 During apartheid, the IFP
became the dominant political party within the KwaZulu homeland,
and the IFP exercised unilateral control over the KwaZulu Legislative
Assembly.105
2.

The ANC's Cross-Ethnic Ideology

In contrast, the ANC was formed in 1912 for the purpose of
resisting European oppression by "creat[ing] one [African] nation out
of many tribes. ''10 6 ANC founder Pixley ka Isaka Seme was a Zulu
South African who was educated in England and the United
States. 10 7 His experiences abroad led him to believe that African
08
nationalism was essential to successful change in South Africa.'
The establishment of the ANC Youth League in 1944 was a turning
point in the resistance movement. 10 9 The Youth League orchestrated
a series of mass civil disobedience campaigns that were aimed at
undermining the government's oppressive legislation. 110 In 1961, in
response to a powerful series of those demonstrations, the
government banned the ANC, forcing many of its leaders into exile."'
In 1962, Nelson Mandela and other prominent resistance leaders
112
were arrested for acts of terrorism.

101.
Kaunda, supra note 99, at 845.
102.
TRADITIONAL DICTATORSHIP, supra note 13.
103.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 23.
104.
JUNG, supra note 91, at 49-50. In 1974, Chief Buthelezi declared, "[A]Ill
members of the Zulu nation are automatically members of Inkatha if they are Zulus.
There may be people who are inactive members as no one escapes being a member as
long as he or she is a member of the Zulu nation." Id. at 50.
105.
TRADITIONAL DICTATORSHIP, supra note 13.
106.
MANDELA, supra note 1, at 87. The ANC was initially called the Native
National Congress but was renamed the "African National Congress" in 1923. A
COUNTRY STUDY: SOUTH AFRICA (Rita M. Byres ed., 1997), available at
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/zatoc.html.
107.
Pixley ka Isaka Seme, 1882-1951, http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/
peoplelbios/seme,p.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
108.
Id.
109.
Lenox S. Hinds, The Gross Violations of Human Rights of the Apartheid
Regime Under InternationalLaw, 1 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 231, 277 n.225 (1999); see
also MANDELA, supra note 1, at 86-88 (discussing the formation of the Youth League).
110.
See Jenkins, supra note 16, at 477-79 (providing a concise account of the
ANC's history and strategies).
111.
Id. at 478.
112.
Tama Koss, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 14 FLA:
J. INVL L. 517, 521 (2002).
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The 1979 Rift between the IFP and the ANC

After 1961, the IFP gained significant support within South
Africa because of the ban on the ANC. 113 The ANC, in contrast,
struggled to organize domestically but gained considerable
international recognition because of its exiled leaders' international
activism." 4 Thus, the two parties appeared to be perfect cohorts in
the fight against apartheid. 115 In 1979, they met in London" 6 in an
7
attempt solidify cooperation. The result, however, was a fatal rift."
At the 1979 meeting, the parties were divided over issues of
strategy." 8 Chief Buthelezi opposed violent resistance in South
Africa and insisted upon negotiating with the government." 9 He
viewed violent revolution as "suicidal" because of the government's
military strength. 120 Furthermore, he considered economic advantage
and political liberation to be of equal importance for black South
Africans. 121 In his view, poverty and political liberation should be
addressed simultaneously. His strategy was to produce a disciplined,
black working class that could negotiate a new democratic
constitution with the apartheid government. 122 Chief Buthelezi,
therefore, was a staunch proponent of individual economic
opportunity and market capitalism. He opposed blanket sanctions on

113. MANDELA, supra note 1, at 501.
114.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 32. The ANC was recognized by the United
Nations and the Organization of African Unity. See generally Ibrahim J. Gassama,
Reaffirming Faith in the Dignity of Every Human Being: The United Nations, NGOs,
and Apartheid, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1464, 1514-16, 1520 (1996).
115.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 32.
116.
JUNG, supra note 91, at 67. See generally JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 32-37
(discussing the circumstances of the 1979 London meeting).
117.
Before 1979, the rift between the IFP and ANC had been ambiguous.
JUNG, supra note 91, at 67; MANDELA, supra note 1, at 501. When Chief Buthelezi
created the IFP in 1975, he was an active member of the ANC youth league and had
received implicit support from ANC leadership for the creation of a Zulu cultural
organization. MANDELA, supra note 1, at 501; Kaunda, supra note 99, at 845.
Furthermore, Chief Buthelezi was a tiresome advocate of Nelson Mandela's release.
Id. He refused to negotiate with the government until the release of political prisoners.
Id. However, the 1979 London meeting is "widely regarded as signalling the final split
between the" ANC and the IFP. JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 32.
118.
See generally JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 15-26 (discussing the differing
liberation strategies of the ANC and the IFP).
119.
Id. at 24.
120.
Id. In 1978, Chief Buthelezi gave an address to Time magazine in which he
stated, "We cannot afford voluntarily to precipitate a holocaust in this country. We are
not afraid to die for our freedom, but we cannot assist the racist regime to make our
unarmed people cannon fodder." M.G. Buthelezi, President, Inkatha Freedom Party,
Address Before the Time Magazine News Tour: What Foreigners Must Know (Mar. 20,
1978), in M.G. BUTHELEZI, POWER ISOURS 129, 135 (1979).
121.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 25-26.
122.
Id. at 24-26.
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foreign investment and supported investment that would provide
123
economic opportunities for black South Africans.
The ANC, however, was in favor of economic sanctions and
violent liberation. 124 It became clear at the 1979 meeting that the
ANC expected the IFP to act as a surrogate for its liberation
strategies.
Chief Buthelezi, despite the common goal and
126
commingled history 125 of the two parties, refused that invitation.
127
The ANC responded by recruiting other domestic organizations
and
violently opposing Chief Buthelezi's cooperation with the
government. 128 Consequently, the ANC regained the support of the
majority of black South Africans, and the IFP was reduced to a
minority organization that drew its support from the predominately
Zulu region of KZN.129 Violence between the two parties culminated
in the early 1990s with an average of 1,500 deaths per year between
1990 and 1994.13°

B.

The Ideological Division between the ANC and the IFP

In addition to historical disagreement over liberation strategies,
the ANC and IFP also had distinct visions of how post-apartheid
South Africa should be structured. 13 1 The IFP was a predictable
advocate of federalism because its constituency was concentrated

123.
Id. at 25-26.
124.
See id. at 15-21 (discussing the ANC's liberation strategies).
125.
See supra note 7 (discussing this history).
126.
See JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 32 ("Chief Buthelezi had, by 1979, developed
his own agenda for power, based on increasing collaboration with Pretoria, and thus
refused to accept the ANC's leadership of the liberation struggle.").
127.
The United Democratic Front (UDF) was created as a result of the 1979
London meeting. Id. at 36. It was a conglomerate of organizations that served as a
surrogate for the ANC while the ANC was banned. See id. at 685 (quoting finding of
the Goldstone Commission that the UDF was "a legalized front for the ANC"). In 1983,
the UDF issued a public statement saying that it was prepared "to affiliate with most
bodies, except Inkatha." Id. at 135.
128.
The most notorious example of the conflict stemming from the 1979 London
meeting occurred in the township of KwaMashu in 1980. Id. at 131. The ANC
organized a series of school boycotts, and the IFP opposed the boycott as destroying the
education and work of Africans. Id. However, supporters of the boycott attacked
school buses and enforced the strike through violence. Id. at 132-33. The KwaMashu
strikes set the stage for the territorial conflicts that subsequently ensued between the
IFP and the ANC for control of KwaZulu-Natal. Id. at 135.
129.
Wilson, supra note 83, at 449-50.
130.
See JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 1-2 (providing a table of the number of
people killed in violence in the KZN region from 1976 through 1996).
131.
See Woolman, supra note 9, at 21-2 to -5 (discussing the IFP and ANC's
structural disagreements with respect to the new constitutional order); see also
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 158 (suggesting that the IFP's "regional project" was a
threat to the ANC-lead path of transformation).
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within one geographical region-KZN. 132
The ANC, however,
supported a strong unitary government because of its emphasis on
African nationalism and its nation-wide support. 13 3 As the transition
from apartheid began to unfold, the ANC emerged as the most
powerful liberation organization, and it entered into several bilateral
agreements with the government regarding the new constitutional
order. 134 The IFP, on the other hand, was increasingly marginalized
at the national level and thus attempted to leverage a federalist
135
structure by consolidating its power within KZN.

132.
See JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 385 (quoting IFP representative as saying
federalism would "provide the distribution of power necessary for future stability");
Christopher A. Ford, Challenges and Dilemmas of Racial and Ethnic Identity in
American and Post-ApartheidSouth African Affirmative Action, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1953,
1990-96 (1996) (disusing the IFP's Zulu heritage and support); Wilson, supra note 83,
at 449-50 (explaining the pragmatic rather than ideological reasons for the IFP's
support of federalism). The preservation of the Zulu nation lends itself to a federalist
structure because the Zulu people are a minority at the national level but are heavily
concentrated within the territory of KZN. JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 385-86. Unlike
other federal republics such as the United States, the IFP did not have any cohorts in
their federalism plot. Id. At times during the constitutional process, the white right
and the IFP were aligned. See THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 259-61 (discussing the
alliance between the IFP and the white right). That coalition was based on the hopes of
a "Volkstaat," i.e. a white Homeland, and an independent KwaZulu Kingdom. Id. The
white right was not concentrated in any particular province or territory, however. Id.
133.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 385.
134.
The most memorable of those bilateral agreements occurred in May 1990,
just months after the ANC was unbanned and Nelson Mandela was released from
prison. It was later termed the Groote Schuur Minute. See Emily McCarthy, South
Africa's Amnesty Process: A Viable Route Toward Truth and Reconciliation?, 3 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 183, 194-95 (1997) (discussing the Groote Schuur Minute). The Groote
Schuur Minute committed the ANC and the South African government to "the
resolution of the existing climate of violence and intimidation from whatever quarters
as well a commitment to stability and to a peaceful process of negotiations." Groote
Schuur Minute, May 4, 1990, Minutes and Accords Between the ANC and the South
African Government, available at http://www.anc.org.zalancdocs/history/minutes.html.
Other notable bilateral agreements between the ANC and the government were the
Pretoria Minute, August 6, 1990; the D.F. Malan Accord, February 12, 1991; and the
Record of Understanding, September 25, 1992. Id. Additionally, as early as 1988, the
ANC had assumed a unilateral stance in regards to liberation. THOMPSON, supra note
16, at 245. Mandela was reported as sending a memorandum to the South African
government in 1988 which stated: "I now consider it necessary in the national interest
for the African National Congress and the government to meet urgently to negotiate an
effective political settlement." Id.
135.
See Gerhard Mard, Playinghis Last Card?Buthelezi's Regional Option, 8 S.
AFR.
REP. No.
3-4,
31
(1993),
available at http://www.africafiles.org/
article.asp?ID=4640 (identifying the "bald political logic" that animated the IFP's
regional inclinations); Wilson, supra note 83, at 449-50 (noting the massive political
mobilization undertaken in order to maintain regional power). However, Chief
Buthelezi repeatedly asserted admirable ideological reasons for his "regional project."
Mar6, supra note 135, at 31. Throughout the apartheid era, Chief Buthelezi refused to
accept independence for KwaZulu because independence for the homelands was a
government strategy aimed at stripping blacks of their South African citizenship.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 21-22. Additionally, Chief Buthelezi was a strong
supporter of regional economics. He believed that "regional consolidation" was the best
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Subnational constitutions were a primary device of the IFP in
that regard. 136 In addition to the 1996 KZN constitution, 137 the IFP
facilitated the drafting of two other provincial constitutions. 138 The
ANC viewed both of those documents as bold challenges to its
liberation strategies and its bilateral negotiations with the
government. 139
1.

The IFP's 1986 Indaba Constitution

In 1986, Chief Buthelezi organized a series of negotiations that
became known as the KwaZulu "Indaba.' 140 The "Indaba" was a
multi-racial gathering of conservative economic and political parties.

means for liberating black South Africans, both economically and politically. Mar6,
supra note 135. Ultimately, however, the IFP was faced with the political reality that
the rift with ANC had resulted in diminished national support for the IFP, which in
turn forced the IFP into the only political space remaining-the region of KZN. Id.
136.
Subnational constitutions are not a necessary element of federalism. See
Elazar, supra note 8, 1-9 (discussing the relationship between subnational
constitutions and federal arrangements). However, the KZN narrative would seem to
suggest that subnational constitution-making during political transition can influence
the ultimate nature of a state's federal arrangement. Indeed, the IFP's three regional
constitutions during the transition from apartheid undoubtedly contributed to South
Africa's final federal structure. Thus, the KZN experience adds a curious twist to the
already anomalous relationship between subnational constitutions and federal
systems.
137.
See infra Part IV (discussing the 1996 KZN Constitution in detail).
138.
See JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 157-58 (discussing the 1986 "Indaba"
Constitution); id. at 375-76 (discussing the 1992 KwaZulu Constitution).
139.
Id. at 158, 277; Press Release, ANC, Statement on the KwaZulu/Natal
Constitution (Dec. 1, 1992), available at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1992/
pr1201a.html. In that statement, issued the same day that the 1992 KwaZulu
constitution was published, the ANC stated:
The step taken by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, which is wholly
dominated by the Inkatha Freedom Party, constitutes a very drastic departure
from the constitutional process that the country has thus far being following.
This unilateral action has implications beyond the borders of the KwaZulu
Bantustan, indeed the legislative assembly states the measure applies to both
KwaZulu and Natal.
Press Release, ANC, supra; see also ANC Statement on the IFP Constitutional
Proposals (Dec. 3, 1992), available at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1992/
pr1203.html (outlining the ANC's precise disagreements with the 1992 KwaZulu
Constitution and concluding that "the content of the IFP's proposals, the process it
proposes for realising them, as well as their express final objective, ride roughshod over
the negotiation process now under way").
140.
See JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 75 (describing the Indaba). See generally
Edward A. Lynch, The KwaZulu/Natal Indaba:A FederalistProposalfor South Africa,
17 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 231 (1987) (providing a detailed description of the Indaba
negotiations and the content of the resultant constitution). "Indaba" is a Zulu word
that is used to refer to a serious negotiation. Lynch, supra note 140, at 232. Its
traditional usage is to reference "an assembly of the chiefs." Id.
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Participants included the Natal Provincial Administration, 14 1 the
IFP, and representatives of South Africa's Indian population. 14 2 The
ANC 143 refused to participate, but the ruling National Party (NP)
attended as an "observer."'1 4 4
The Indaba produced a draftconstitution for the combined region of KZN and proposed one multiracial provincial legislature.
The document called for universal franchise yet suggested a
bicameral legislature with members of one chamber elected to
represent each of the four major racial communities. The other
chamber would be elected by the adult franchise at large. 145 The
document also called for a federation of South African States, of
which KZN would be the first constituent, and included a universal
bill of human rights. 146 The document's bold claims received support
from 82% of the delegates, and the Indaba called for a provincial
referendum to determine the views of the people from both KwaZulu
and Natal. 147 The referendum never took place, however, and the
14
government rejected the constitution. 8
The ANC-which had been engaged in bilateral, unpublicized
meetings with the government since July 1984149-also rejected the
Indaba Constitution. The ANC viewed the Indaba as an impediment
to the liberation movement because it entrenched racial distinctions
in the representative order and was therefore inapposite to a

141.
The Natal Provincial Administration was the white local government body
that had jurisdiction over the province of Natal. The Indaba was formally convened by
both the KwaZulu and Natal governments. JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 75.
142.
Id. at 75.
143.
Although the ANC was officially banned during this period, its surrogate,
the UDF, refused to participate despite receiving a formal invitation. See supra note
127 (discussing the UDF); see also Lynch, supra note 140, at 233 (mentioning the
UDF's participation). The ANC also issued various statements regarding the Indaba
via exiled leaders and other alliance organizations, such as the South African
Communist Party. JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 158.
144.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 75; Lynch, supra note 140, at 233-34.
145.
The configuration of the proposed legislature was complex. The first
chamber, although intended to represent the adult franchise at large, was further
divided into fifteen districts. Lynch, supra note 140, at 237-38. The proposed districts
would have resulted in the IFP receiving over seventy of the one-hundred available
seats. Id. at 238. The second chamber would have consisted of fifty total seats with
ten being allocated to each of the following ethnic groups: Afrikaans, Asian, English,
and African. Id. The remaining ten seats would be allocated to voters who wished to
vote without ethnic affiliation. Id.
146.
See id. at 236. The Bill of Rights was modeled after the United States
Constitution's Bill of Rights. Id. It was a progressive statement of individual liberties
and stood in stark contrast to the laws of apartheid. Id.
147.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 75, 157.
148.
Lynch, supra note 140, at 242-44.
149.
See Bouckaert, supra note 79, at 384-85 (discussing the secret negotiations
between Mandela and the government); see also Hendrik W. van der Merwe,
FacilitationBetween the Apartheid Establishment and the African National Congress
in Exile, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 13 (1997) (discussing the negotiations between the
government and other exiled ANC leaders).
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democratic society. 150 The ANC also objected on strategic grounds,
stating that until apartheid was categorically broken there was no
value in negotiating constitutional arrangements. 151 According to the
ANC, the Indaba constitution was Inkatha's vision of the new South
152
Africa and not the will of the people at large.
The ANC's greatest fear, however, was that the Indaba proposal
would provide an "alternative, negotiated path to the transformation
of South Africa" that would erode support for the ANC's violent
liberation strategies. 153 The ANC viewed the Indaba as a direct
attack on its liberation agenda and its ongoing negotiations with the
government. 154 Consequently, the failed Indaba Constitution was
followed by "war-like" outbreaks of violence within KZN. 155
2.

The 1992 KwaZulu Constitution

After the Indaba, the IFP became obsessed with regional
autonomy. 156 By the late 1980s, the ANC had emerged as the
dominant liberation party. 157 Its strategic attacks on governed
infrastructure had successfully strong-armed the government into
negotiating an end to the ANC's military activity. 158 In 1988, the
government confirmed that it had been meeting with imprisoned
ANC leadership, and in 1990 Nelson Mandela was released from
prison.
A series of bilateral agreements were subsequently
negotiated between the ANC and the government. 159
The most
notable was the September 1992 Record of Understanding. That

150.
Lynch, supra note 140, at 243.
151.
Id.
152.
See JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 158 (quoting the ANC as stating: "[The
Indaba] is the [IFP] . .. solution and not that of the people of Natal, let alone of the
entire country.").
153.
Id.
154.
Id.
155.
Id. at 159.
156.
See Mar6, supra note 135 (quoting Chief Buthelezi as saying, "My answer is
that KwaZulu will never be broken up, will never be destroyed. . . . The KwaZulu
Police will not therefore be integrated with the South African Police.").
157.
Id.; see also THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 244 (discussing the interactions
in the 1980s that the ANC had with other groups as the ANC was seen as the "most
popular and most effective of the banned black political organizations").
158.
See THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 211-13, 243-45 (noting several of the
ANC's confrontations with the government and the subsequent negotiations). In 1961,
the ANC created "Umkhonto we Sizwe" (Spear of the Nation), which was the military
wing of the ANC. MANDELA, supra note 1, at 239. The impetus for Umkhonto we
Sizwe was the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre, in which the South African Defense Force
shot and killed sixty unarmed protestors. Id. at 206-08. The creation of Umkhonto we
Sizwe signified the end of the ANC's non-violent resistance. Makau wa Mutua, Hope
and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 63, 73 (1997).

159.
See Bouckaert, supra note 79, at 393-95 (discussing the bilateral
agreements between the ANC and the government); see also supra note 134 (same).
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agreement formally committed the ANC and the NP to a
160
democratically elected transitional government.
The IFP was not party to the Record of Understanding, and after
the ANC's unbanning in 1990, the IFP was increasingly marginalized
at the national level. 161 The IFP nevertheless retained strong
support within KZN. Consequently, the IFP adopted a strategy of
16 2
It
brinkmanship with respect to the national transition process.
appeared willing to thrust the country into civil war, rather than
16 3
accept bilateral agreements between the ANC and the government.
The IFP asserted that the transition to democracy should be based on
all-inclusive, multilateral agreements.
In December 1992, the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly drafted
another provincial constitution. 164
Every member of the 1992
KwaZulu Legislative Assembly was from the IFP, 165 and the
constitution was representative of the IFP's brinkmanship strategies.
The plain purpose of the draft constitution was to separate KwaZulu
from the rapidly progressing national constitutional process. The
preamble to the 1992 draft stated:
Whereas the Kwazulu Government intends to adopt the Constitution of
the State of KwaZulu/Natal with the understanding that with its final
ratification the Constitution will become the supreme law of the land
and shall stand as such regardless and in spite of whatever course the
166
negotiations at central level will happen to take.

Furthermore, Chief Buthelezi publicly championed the 1992
constitution as a means of preventing the "degeneration" of the

160.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 371-72.
161.
See Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A
Comparison of Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 22
(2003) (concluding that "the fact remains that the ANC-NP coalition provided the
framework for nearly all the negotiations of South Africa's transition."). The IFP
violently opposed the Record of Understanding. JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 371-72.
Chief Buthelezi declared that the Record of Understanding represented the ANC's
hegemonic mentality and would 'lead to the victory of revolutionaries over
institutionalized South African influences and democratic forces." Id. at 371 (quoting
statement of Chief Buthelezi).
162.
See Mar6, supra note 135 ("Inkatha's strength as a national actor is
primarily that of a spoiler.").
163.
The IFP's "underlying strategy was to cause so much carnage and mayhem
that the elections would have to be postponed." JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 419.
Conscious of that tactic, the government, on the eve of the first democratic election in
1994, issued a state of emergency in KZN. Id.
164.
Id. at 375-76. For a thorough evaluation of the content and context of the
1992 constitution, see Stephen Ellmann, Federalism Awry: The Structure of
Government in the KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, 9 S. AFRICAN J. ON HUM. RTS. 165
(1993).
165.
ROB AMATO, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW CONSTITUTION 50-56 (1994). The
KwaZulu Legislative Assembly had not held elections for seven years prior to 1992. Id.
166.
Id. at 56.
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national political process into bilateral negotiations between the ANC
167
and the government.
The substance of the 1992 document was very similar to the
Indaba Constitution. It called for the sovereignty of KZN and a
federation of South African States. 168
However, the 1992 draft
purported to create a "state militia" and prohibited the stationing of
"federal" armed forces within KZN absent the provincial
government's approval. 169 That provision, although consistent with
extreme federalist ideology, appears to have been a covert threat to
the ANC. 170 The constitution also purported to establish a provincial
171
constitutional court and included a bill of rights.
The ANC's response to the 1992 constitution was insightful. In a
statement released the same day that the IFP published the
constitution, the ANC noted: "The step taken by the KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly, which is wholly dominated by the Inkatha
Freedom Party, constitutes a very drastic departure from the
constitutional process that the country has thus far being following.
This unilateral action has implications beyond the borders of the
KwaZulu Bantustan .... -172 Both the ANC and the IFP clearly
understood that the KwaZulu constitution was a means by which the
IFP was interjecting into the national constitutional process. The
constitution's publication was followed by outbursts of violence across
3
KZN.17
C. The 1994 Election
The ANC/IFP conflict reached its climax during the weeks
preceding the country's first democratic election in 1994.174 Although

167.
See TRADITIONAL DICTATORSHIP, supra note 13 (quoting IFP representative
as saying "the new constitution will stand in force, regardless of the direction taken by
the constitutional process of South Africa."); see also JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 376 ("If
it were ratified the constitution would become supreme law in the area, in spite of
whatever course the negotiations at central level might take.").
168.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 375; Ellmann, supra note 164, at 168-69.
169.
Ellmann, supra note 164, at 170-71.
170.
See AMATO, supra note 165, at 72 (noting that there were reports that the
IFP was indeed training troops to defend the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly that
passed the constitution).
171.
Id. at 50-56; Ellmann, supra note 164, at 169.
172.
Press Release, ANC, supra note 139. The South African government
immediately opposed the KwaZulu Constitution and also recognized its bold challenge
to the ANC-NP negotiated transition. JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 276-77.
173.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 376.
174.
Violence in KZN rose to anarchic proportions. See generally TRADITIONAL
DICTATORSHIP, supra note 13 (discussing the violence before and after the 1994
election); Rupert Taylor, Justice Denied: Political Violence in KwaZulu-Natal After
1994 (Ctr. for the Study of Violence & Reconciliation, Violence & Transition Series,
2002), available at http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/politicalviolence/justicedenied.pdf
(same).
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the ANC and the government had agreed that a general election
should be held, 175 the IFP refused to participate, demanding greater
independence for KZN and constitutional recognition for the Zulu
Monarch. 176 The IFP appeared determined to sabotage the election
by destabilizing KZN unless those demands were met. 177 The ANC,
on the other hand, remained committed to a strong central
government and refused to compromise the democratic nature of the
national constitution by granting ex officio recognition to the Zulu
178
Monarch.
However, a week before the election, the IFP agreed to
participate. 179 The IFP's participation was partially attributable to a
creative compromise whereby the ANC agreed to amend the national
constitution, which authorized the provinces to adopt constitutions, to
require a constitution for KZN that would recognize the Zulu
Monarch. 8 0 That concession appeased the IFP because it guaranteed
a degree of independence for KZN and constitutional recognition for

175.
See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
176.
See THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 261-62 (noting the IFP's massive
demonstration in Johannesburg which resulted in the death of many IFP members);
van Rensburg, supra note 79, at 45.
177.
THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 259-61; Bill Keller, Zulu and Afrikaner
Leaders Rally the Wrathful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1994. See generally Mar6, supra note
135 (mentioning this potential destabilization).
178.
MANDELA, supra note 1, at 535-37; see also wa Mutua, supra note 158, at
98 (discussing the ideological conflict between the IFP and the ANC regarding the
Monarch and Zulu heritage in the "New South Africa").
179.
THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 262.
180.
That historical compromise became known as the "Skekuza agreement."
See RICHARD SPITZ & MATTHEW CHASKALSON, THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION 162 (2000)
(discussing the circumstances of the agreement). It occurred on April 19, 1994. Id. In
1995, an IFP spokesperson declared that "were it not for the [Skekuza agreement] we
would not, and should not, be sitting in this [government]." JEFFERY, supra note 13, at
611.
The agreement was memorialized in a "memorandum of agreement," which
contained its essential terms and the exact language that later would be used to amend
the IC. The memorandum stated:
Section 160 of the Constitution is hereby amended by the substitution for the
proviso to subsection (3) of the following proviso:
Provided that a provincial constitution may-(a) provide for legislative and
executive structures and procedures different from those provided for in this
Constitution in respect of a province; and, (b) where applicable, provide for the
institution, role, authority and status of a traditional monarch in the province,
and shall make such provision for the Zulu Monarch in the case of the province
of KwaZululNatal.
Joint Statement Between President Mandela, F.W. de Klerk, & M. Buthelezi (Apr. 19,
1994), available at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1994lpr0419.
The interim national constitution was subsequently amended to input the above
language. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act 2 of 1994 s.
8(a); Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act 3 of 1994 s. 1;
see also S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 § 160(3)(b) (containing amended language).
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the Monarch, albeit in the form of a future provincial constitution.
With the IFP's participation, the 1994 elections proceeded without
significant disturbance and marked the birth of South Africa's
democracy.

IV.

THE

1996 KZN

CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS

A. The National Catalyst for the KZN Constitution
After the celebrated democratic election of April 1994,181 the
newly elected national government immediately began the process of
drafting a permanent constitution that would replace the IC.18 2 The
Constitutional Assembly was established in June of 1994 and was
charged with drafting the new constitution.1 8 3 The Constitutional
Assembly was initially celebrated as an all-inclusive body because the
IFP was an active participant.1 4 However, the IFP hastily withdrew
from the constitutional talks, alleging, among other things, that the
proposed national constitution severely reduced the powers of the
5
provinces.'

8

181.
See infra Part V.A. (discussing the 1994 election). The 1994 election was
South Africa's first democratic, multi-racial election. See THOMPSON, supra note 16, at
263-64 (recounting the results and events of the 1994 election).
182.
See Sarkin, supra note 16, at 67-87 (giving a thorough explanation of the
legal nature of the IC and the legal documents that formed the basis for the negotiated
transition to democracy); supra text accompanying note 16 (discussing the relationship
between the IC and the final NC).
183.
Sarkin, supra note 16, at 68-69 (noting that most significantly, the
Constitutional Assembly had representatives from all political parties that had
received national parliamentary seats following the 1994 election); see supra text
accompanying note 16 (explaining the nature of the Constitutional Assembly and its
mandate).
184.
The IFP won 10.5% of the national vote, which equated to forty-three seats
in the 490-seat Constitutional Assembly. JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 445; see also
THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 264 (noting that the ANC won 62.65% of the vote and 252
seats); see also S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 § 68 (describing the nature of the
Constitutional Assembly).
185.
The IFP initially left the Constitutional Assembly in mid-February 1995.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 610-14. However, it returned to the Constitutional
Assembly in early March on the condition that the disputed issue of provincial
authority be submitted to international mediation within a month. Id. at 611. When
that deadline passed, the IFP again withdrew. Id. After the first draft of the final
national constitution was published and rejected by the Constitutional Court, the IFP
again returned to the Constitutional Assembly for a brief period. Id. at 615. However,
the IFP quickly withdrew, and the Constitutional Assembly's final vote regarding the
NC took place without the IFP. Id. at 616.
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Immediately after its withdrawal from the Constitutional
Assembly, 8 6 the IFP initiated the drafting of a provincial constitution
for KZN. As had been the case in 1992, the IFP viewed the KZN
constitution as a "surrogate for its participation in the [national]
constitutional deliberations, '1 8 7 and it intended to use the provincial
constitution-making process as a platform for its opposition to the
Constitutional Assembly.1 88
Although that strategy was familiar to the IFP,18 9 the dynamics
of the drafting process would be vastly different from prior IFP
initiatives. The 1994 election had resulted in a multiparty KZN
parliament. 190 More important, although the IFP won forty-one of
the eighty-one parliamentary seats, the ANC won twenty-six seats. 191
A provincial constitution, therefore, would require the IFP to
cooperate with the ANC and other minority parties in order to secure
192
the two-thirds majority required by the IC (fifty-four votes).
Further, South Africa's newly-adopted IC expressly authorized

186.
The IFP's final ultimatum for the Constitutional Assembly expired at the
end of March, 1995, at which point it left the Assembly. Id. at 611. It began the KZN
drafting process in April 1995. Id.
187.
George E. Devenish, The Making and Significance of the Draft KwazuluNatal Constitution, 1999 Y.B. AFRICAN L. 47, 505.
188.
See KwaZulu-Natal's New Constitution: No Losers . . . Any Winners?,
(Helen Suzman Found., Univ. of Natal, Durban), Mar. 1996, at 1, 2 [hereinafter KZN's
New Constitution] (stating that provincial constitutions would "provide the
institutional basis for the expression of provincial autonomy"); Ralph Lawrence, Where
There's Political Will, There Might Be a Way: Subnational Constitutions and the Birth
of Democracy in South Africa, in SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE 87, 90
(Gretchen Carpenter ed., 1999).
The [IFP's] plans afoot were running in tandem with the process at the
national level to transform the Interim Constitution into a final version by
[Dieliberations in KwaZulu-Natal over the terms of a provincial
1996 ....
constitution were being used as a bargaining ploy to wrest greater powers for
the provinces in the national document.
In a special news conference where the IFP addressed its boycott of the Constitutional
Assembly, Chief Buthelezi stated, "Our provincial constitution ... must contain a very
clear statement outlining and detailing once and for all the demand for autonomy of
the people of this region." JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 617.
189.
See supra text accompanying notes 164-73 (discussing the 1992 KwaZulu
Constitution and its relationship to the national negotiations. between the ANC and the
South African government).
Seven parties were represented, compared to the 1992 KwaZulu legislature
190.
that was entirely comprised of IFP representatives. The other six parties were the
ANC, the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), the Minority Front (MF), the
National Party, the Democratic Party (DP), and the Pan African Congress (PAC).
Independent Electoral Commission, Elections '94, http://www.elections.org.za/
Elections94.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2008).
Id. (providing the complete results of the provincial election in 1994: forty191.
one seats for the IFP (50.61%); twenty-six seats for the ANC (32.09 %); nine seats for
the NP (11%); two seats for the DP; one seat for the ACDP; one seat for the MF; and
one seat for the PAC).
192.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 618.
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subnational constitutions and established procedures for their
enactment-one of which was certification by the Constitutional
Court. 193 Thus, unlike prior IFP drafting initiatives, which were
entirely ultra vires, the 1996 KZN constitution would occur within
the processes and institutions delineated by the national constitution.
Escalating violence within KZN added to the urgency of the KZN
constitutional process. 194 The province experienced a reprieve after
the signing of the April 19, 1994 Memorandum of Agreement. 195 The
IFP had peacefully participated in the election, and President
Mandela offered Chief Buthelezi a position in the executive cabinet as
a gesture of good faith. 196 However, the IFP's boycott of the
Constitutional Assembly reignited the ANC/IFP conflict and
1 97
threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the final NC.
Consequently, the ANC and the NP hoped that an all-inclusive
provincial constitution would stabilize KZN and restore a degree of
legitimacy to the national deliberations. 198 Indeed, the direct nexus
between the KZN constitution-making process and the broader
ANC/IFP conflict was undeniable. As one observer eloquently noted:
"[I]t always remained the case that the fundamental differences
expressed in words across the stately Provincial Chamber in
Pietermaritzburg, might be expressed as rifle fire across a valley in
another part of the province."'199
B.

The ConstitutionalNegotiations

The KZN Legislature initiated the drafting process in April 1995
by creating a constitutional committee to be chaired by IFP
representative Arthur Konigkramer. 20 0 The job of the committee was
to approve a draft constitution by a two-thirds majority and present it

193.
Id.
194.
Id. at 662-63; Devenish, supra note 187, at 511.
195.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 445, 499.
196.
See id. at 447 (explaining that Chief Buthelezi served as the Minister of
Home Affairs).
197.
See id. at 637 (discussing the increased political violence during the IFP's
absence from the Constitutional Assembly); id. at 531 (quoting ANC Secretary General
as saying, "If we [the ANC] allow the constitution to be written through any body other
than the Constitutional Assembly . . . we run the risk of bequeathing to future
generations in this country an illegitimate and undemocratic constitution.").
198.
Indeed, the ANC leadership expressed hope that the provincial
constitution-making process "would pave the way for the IFP's return to the
Constitutional Assembly, in time to participate in the adoption of the final
constitution." Id. at 533 (quoting Secretary General of the ANC, Cyril Ramaphosa).
Furthermore, the national leadership of both the IFP and the ANC were in constant
contact with their provincial representatives. Devenish, supra note 187, at 506 n.17.
199.
KZN's New Constitution,supra note 188, at 8.
200.
Id. at 2.
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to the legislature by March 11, 1996.201 If the legislature also
approved the document by a two-thirds majority, the document could
be submitted to the Court for certification. 20 2
The political
configuration of the committee was such that the IFP could get a twothirds majority only if it gathered the support of the ANC or the
remaining minority parties. 203 The IFP was therefore barred from
any unilateral action.
In August 1995, the committee produced a 'Working Document
on Constitutional Principles," which became known as the Fernhill
Agreement. 20 4 The Fernhill Agreement was approved by a two-thirds
majority, including the ANC, and involved a great deal of compromise
by all parties. 20 5 Both the ANC and the IFP celebrated the document
as all-inclusive and emphasized the spirit of cooperation with which it
2 06
had been negotiated.
Nonetheless,
the
IFP's
national
leadership
removed
Kronigkramer from the committee because he had acted without a
mandate.20 7 Kronigkramer was replaced by Mike Tarr, and the
Fernhill Agreement was replaced with the "Green Paper. '20 8 The
Green Paper was significantly more secessionist than the Fernhill
Agreement, and it embodied the IFP's desire to establish greater
authority for the provinces than was conceived under the proposed
national constitution. 20 9 The ANC responded immediately by calling
the Green Paper an attack on the supremacy of the proposed national
constitution. 210 Consequently, the IFP began to suspect that the ANC
would stall the drafting process until after the completion of the
permanent national constitution.2 11
Thus, the IFP abandoned

201.
Id. at 8.
202.
See S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 § 160 (describing the procedures by
which a provincial legislature could draft a provincial constitution).
203.
van Rensburg, supranote 79, at 45.
204.
KZN's New Constitution, supra note 188, at 2.
205.
Id. at 2-3.
206.
Id.; JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 537. However, the document was decidedly
in conflict with the IC because it declared broad powers for the province. KZN's New
Constitution, supra note 188, at 3.
207.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 537-38; KZN's New Constitution, supra note
188, at 3; see also Press Release, ANC, Statement on IFP National Caucus (Sept. 17,
1995), available at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1995/pr0917a.html (discussing the
IFP's loss of direction and the attack on Kronigkramer).
208.
KZN's New Constitution, supranote 188, at 3-5.
209.
Id. at 4-5. Indeed, the Green Paper contained "Constitutional Principles."
The second Principle stated, "The Constitution shall express the aspirations of the
Province to achieve a substantially greater degree of autonomy and self-rule within the
parameters of a united South Africa once the national constitutional framework so
allows." Id. at 5. Thus, the IFP's substitution of the Green Paper for the Fernhill
Agreement evidences the IFP's intent to use the provincial process as a surrogate for
participation in the Constitutional Assembly.
210.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 538-39.
211.
KZN's New Constitution, supra note 188, at 6.
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attempts at drafting an all-inclusive document and tried to
circumvent ANC participation by procuring the support of the
minority parties.212
The IFP faced a formidable challenge, however, because the
minority parties represented a wide range of interests and none was
anxious to alienate the ANC. 213 Faced with that challenge, the IFP
resorted to the unilateral politics of the past.214 In an effort to
subvert the two-thirds majority necessary to pass a constitutional
amendment, the IFP proposed a new provincial government
institution called the "Council of State. '' 215 The Council would ratify
actions taken by the provincial executive cabinet and thereby bypass
the legislature. If a member of the cabinet dissented, only then would
the matter be presented to the legislature. Additionally, the Council
would be comprised of two representatives from each of the three
political parties with the largest number of seats in parliament-the
216
IFP, ANC, and NP.
The Council of State was the IFP's attempt at circumventing the
minority parties by eliciting the support of the NP, which stood the
most to gain from the Council of State. The IFP hoped to lure the NP
into supporting its proposed constitution in exchange for equal voting
strength through the Council of State. 217 However, the Council of
State succeeded only in breeding resentment towards the IFP by the
minority parties, who refused to vote for its creation.2 18 Additionally,
the ANC refused to participate in a process that would be dictated by
the NP and the IFP.2 19 Thus, the ANC threatened the NP by stating
that, if necessary, it would adopt the same exclusionary tactics in the
national Constitutional Assembly.220 The NP quickly abandoned its
alliance with the IFP because of the superior interests that were at
22 1
stake in the national constitutional deliberations.
Nevertheless, the committee published a draft constitution on
February 7, 1996, in the hope that public input would resolve the

212.
Id.
213.
Id. at 6, 9; see also JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 540 (discussing the minority
parties' unwillingness to alienate the ANC).
214.
The IFP had also suggested that it would call a new election in KZN so that
it could get the necessary majority to exclude the ANC. JEFFERY, supra note 13, at
618; KZN's New Constitution,supra note 188, at 6.
215.
See generally KZN's New Constitution, supra note 188, at 6-7 (describing
the nature of the Council of State).
216.
Id.; see also Independent Electoral Commission, supra note 191 (showing
the identities of the three largest parties).
217.
KZN's New Constitution, supranote 188, at 6; van Rensburg, supra note 79,
at 46-47.
218.
KZN's New Constitution, supranote 188, at 6.
219.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 538.
220.
Id.
221.
Id. at 538-39.
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political stalemate. 222 The committee held public meetings and
received over 227 public submissions. 223 The draft constitution was
also submitted to two legal experts for an evaluation as to whether it
would be certified by the Court. 224 The substance of the document
was extravagant.2 25 It "gave expression to a desire for both cogent
provincial autonomy and asymmetry for KwaZulu-Natal." 22 6 It
contained a universal bill of rights, called for the autonomy of the
province, and attempted to regulate the relationship of the province
vis-a-vis the national government. 227 The legal experts identified
those constitutional flaws and recommended that the document be
228
revised.
The committee therefore returned to the negotiating table. The
ANC claimed that it was eager to proceed but had concerns about the
document's radical claim of provincial autonomy.22 9 At that point,
several minority parties withdrew from the committee, alleging that
their demands had been perpetually overlooked. 23 0 The IFP was
therefore forced to find agreement with the NP and the ANC. The
three parties could not reach an agreement, however, and talks ended
on March 11, 1996.231 The IFP tried to elicit the support of the
minority parties in one last attempt to table the constitution on the
March 11 deadline. 232 The IFP was able to gain the support of only
the Minority Front. 233 However, the IFP-Minority Front coalition
still did not equate to the necessary two-thirds majority.
Additionally, the Minority Front was not willing to oppose the
ANC. 234 Thus, the Minority Front stood between the IFP and the
ANC, offering support to each if both parties would in turn support
23 5
each other.
Consequently, on March 14, the ANC agreed to re-enter the
negotiations, 236 and at 8:00 a.m. on March 15, a draft constitution

222.
KZN's New Constitution, supra note 188, at 7-8.
223.
See id. at 7 (noting that four public meetings were held).
224.
See id. at 7 (discussing the legal experts' conclusions); van Rensburg, supra
note 79, at 47-48.
225.
See Devenish, supra note 187, at 507-08 (discussing the language of the
Constitution).
226.
Id. at 505.
227.
Id.
228.
KZN's New Constitution, supra note 188, at 7.
229.
Id. at 8.
230.
Id. at 8-9.
231.
Id. at 9.
232.
Id.
233.
Id.
234.
Id.
235.
See id. at 9-10 (discussing the maneuverings of the MF leadership during
the breakdown period). The Minority Front leader, Amichand Rajbansi, visited Nelson
Mandela during this time and also met with other national ANC leaders in Cape Town.
Id. at 10.
236.
Id. at 10.
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was passed unanimously by the committee. 23 7 The ANC, operating
under directives from its national leadership, made significant
concessions and deviated from its previous position by agreeing to
various contentious clauses relating to provincial autonomy. 23 8 The
provincial legislature unanimously approved the draft document, and
the document was submitted to the Court for certification on March
25, 1996.239
C. The Content of the KZN Constitutionand the Constitutional
Court's CertificationJudgment
The content of the constitution embodied the IFP's opposition to
the Constitutional Assembly. Chapter 1 of the constitution declared:
This Constitution sets out the basis for the interaction between the
Province of KwaZulu Natal and the rest of the Republic of South Africa,
in order to expand the powers and functions of this Province, so as to
enable its people to enjoy greater self-determination within a united
240
federal framework.

Chapter 1 also stated that "the relationship between the Province and
the national government shall be based on the principles of federal
partnership, parity and mutual respect."'241 Those declarations ran
directly contra to both the IC and the concurrent proposals of the
Constitutional Assembly. 242 The document created a provincial
constitutional court,243 contained an elaborate bill of rights, 244 and
endowed traditional leaders with automatic representation in local
government. 245 Finally, the constitution purported to define the
competence of the provincial legislature by declaring various
2 46
categories of exclusive provincial authority, including taxation.
On September 6, 1996, the Court issued its certification
decision. 247 The Court unanimously and unequivocally ruled that the
document was "fatally flawed" for numerous reasons. 248 The Court

Id.
237.
238.
Id.
2 (S. Afr.); see also KMZ's
239.
KZN Certification 1996 (11) BCLR 1419 (CC)
New Constitution, supra note 188, at 10 (noting that the Consitution had been
submitted).
240.
241.

PROVINCE OF KwAZULU NATAL CONST. 1996 ch. 1. § 1(8).
Id. ch. 1, § 1(5).

242.
Section 1(1) of the IC provides: "The Republic of South Africa shall be one,
sovereign state." S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 § 1(1). Section 1 of the final NC
provides: "The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state." S. AFR.
CONST. 1996 § 1.
243.
244.

PROVINCE OF KwAZULU NATAL CONST. 1996 ch. 8.
Id. ch. 3.

245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. ch. 12, § 3(5)(1).
Id. ch. 5, § 1(2).
KZN Certification 1996 (11) BCLR 1419 (CC) (S. Mr.).
Id. 13.
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ruled that various provisions attempted to usurp national powers and
were therefore inconsistent with the IC.249 In particular, the Court

made reference to portions of the bill of rights,2 50 the establishment of
a constitutional court, 251 and the enlargement of provincial legislative
authority. 252 The Court emphasized that "[u]nlike their counterparts
in the United States of America, the provinces in South Africa are not
sovereign states. They were created by the Constitution and have
only those powers that are specifically conferred on them under the
Constitution. ' 253 The Court concluded its judgment by stating, "It is
necessary to emphasize that our discussion does not purport to be an
all-embracing one, for to have done so would have been
supererogatory, given the widely flawed nature of the provincial
Constitution. '254 The Court's decision rendered the constitution
inoperative.2 55 However, the value of the KZN constitution was
enduring because of processes that it induced and the flexibility that
it provided within South Africa's federal structure. Those virtues will
now be considered.

249.
Id.
13-18.
250.
Id. 31.
251.
Id. 33.
252.
Id.
15.
253.
Id.
14 (quoting In re The Nat'l Educ. Bill No. 83 of 1995 1996 (4) BCLR
518 (CC) para. 23 (S. Afr.)). That language clearly reaffirmed the "devolutionary"
nature of South Africa's federal systems. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying
text (discussing the devolutionary system); see also Williams, supranote 4, at 642.
254.
KZN Certification(11) BCLR 1419 47.
255.
It should be noted that KZN initiated one other attempt at a provincial
constitution in 2004. See Sibonelo Msomi, Premier Calls for a KZN Constitution,
WITNESS (Pietermartizburg, S. Afr.), May 20, 2004. The Legislature did not vote on the
proposed 2004 draft, however, and KZN still operates under the default provisions of
the NC. See KZN Draft Constitution Not Adopted, MERCURY (Durban, S. Afr.), June 1,
2005. The 2004 constitutional process was interesting because it was initiated by the
ANC, which, for the first time, secured a majority in the KZN Legislature after the
2004 election. See Independent Electoral Commission, National & ProvincialElections
2004, http://www.election.org.za/Election2004Static.asp?radResult=50&sel Province=4
(last visited Feb. 9, 2008) (providing a list of the election results). The ANC received
46.98% of the vote, and the IFP received 36.82%. Id. Thus, the ANC initiated the
drafting of a provincial constitution in an attempt to exert its majority status. The IFP
ultimately sabotaged the process by refusing to participate, thus eliminating the
possibility of the legislature getting the required two-thirds majority. KZN Draft
ConstitutionNot Adopted, supra note 255. Unlike prior constitution-making attempts,
the 2004 process was not accompanied by any political violence. Bheki ka Mncube,
KZN "No Longer Strife Province," WITNESS (Pietermartizburg, S. Afr.), Dec. 3, 2004.
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V.

REGIME-THREATENING CONFLICTS AND SUBNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS

Successful political change requires transitional government
systems that can accommodate regime-threatening conflicts. 256 In
1991, Donald Horowitz recognized that successful change in South
Africa would require opposing parties to be channeled into legitimate
processes and institutions where they could negotiate the nature of
the new constitutional order. 25 7 Horowitz emphasized that peaceful

256.
See HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH
AFRICA'S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 5 (2000) ("[P]rocesses and institutions
provide . . . a means, in effect, to civilize the bitter political conflicts which [tend] to
degenerate into violent confrontation."). Klug provides a fascinating account of South
Africa's political transition, focusing on the role of the Constitutional Court as a
transitional government institution. Id. at 14-15. Klug notes that the Court played a
fundamental role in South Africa's transition because it provided "a space in which...
irreconcilable conflicts [could] be temporarily if not permanently mediated, allowing
political contestants to embrace democratic procedures and outcomes." Id. at 14.
Thus, "even those parties who walked out of the negotiations, such as the Inkatha
Freedom Party, have accepted the Court's interpretation of their claims."
Id.
However, although Mug references the IFP's subnational constitution making, he does
not credit that process as a contributing factor in South Africa's successful transition.
Id. at 102. Rather, Mug's claim is that the IFP's acquiescence to the Court's mediation
of political conflict evinced the arrival of "constitutionalism" within South Africa. Id. at
14.
The claim of this Article is perhaps more preliminary-the subnational
constitution-making process provided a means for "constitutionalism" to develop within
South Africa and created an opportunity for the Court to mediate the ANC/IFP conflict.
Nevertheless, Mug's theoretical observations are sound-transitional governments
must be able to mange regime-threatening conflicts. Id. at 4. The Court was one
essential institution in South Africa's experience; subnational constitutions were
another.
257.
DONALD L. HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA? CONSTITUTIONAL
ENGINEERING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY 33-34 (1991). Horowitz reasoned that once that
dialogue begins within the confines of legitimate institutions and processes, the parties
have implicitly endorsed those institutions and are confronted with the high costs of
abandoning them. Id. Horowitz's paradigm is consistent with theories of "transitional
constitutionalism." See generally Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence:The Role of
Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2076 (1997) (discussing
transitional constitutionalism). Transitional constitutionalism emphasizes the many
functions of law during periods of political transformation. Id.; see also Kirsti Samuels,
Post-Conflict Peace-Buildingand Constitution-Making, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 663, 667-68
(2006) (discussing the practical value of constitution-making during political change).
Ruti Teitel has noted that constitution-making is "inextricably enmeshed in
transformative politics." Teitel, supra note 257, at 2076. Additionally, other scholars
have observed that constitution-making during political transition is a "process or a
forum for negotiation amid conflict and division." Samuels, supra note 257, at 668.
In particular, Heinz Mug has noted that constitutional processes can facilitate
successful political change by providing legal structure to political debate and
disagreement. KLUG, supra note 256, at 14; see also Ashley Crossland, Constituting
Democracy: Law, Globalism, and South Africa's Political Reconstruction by Heinz Klug,
25 MELB. U. L REV. 859, 859-64 (providing a helpful distillation of Kug's
observations). By so doing, transitional constitutional systems manage conflict and
thus facilitate successful regime change. KLUG, supra note 256, at 14. According to
Klug, constitutional processes must be able to suspend violence that threatens to

622

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 41:'585

change required a flexible government system that could divert
regime-threatening conflicts into legitimate institutions and
2 58
processes.
In retrospect, Horowitz's observations were prophetic. South
Africa's transitional government system successfully managed the
ANC/IFP conflict. Subnational constitutions were integral to that
transition. In two separate instances, the availability of subnational
constitutions within South Africa's federal structure provided the
ANC and the IFP with the increased political flexibility necessary to
maintain dialogue within the system's strictures.
Those two
instances will be considered in turn.
A. Managing Conflict by IncreasingPoliticalFlexibility at the
NationalLevel
Authorizing subnational units to adopt constitutions can
promote stability by increasing political flexibility at the national
level. Political actors may be able to make concessions in the form of
a regional constitution that they could not make at the national level.
Conversely, minority political parties may be able to exact guarantees
in a subnational constitution that they would not have the political
clout to leverage at the national level.
Thus, subnational
constitutions increase a system's ability to accommodate societal
conflicts because they enlarge the array of solutions available to
negotiating parties.
The KZN experience is illustrative of that
general principle.
In 1993, South Africa's transitional government established a
timeline for political change and set April 26-29 as the dates for the
country's first democratic election. 259 However, on February 12, the
deadline for registration to participate in the election, the IFP failed
to register. 260 Both the ANC and the NP realized that "it would be
disastrous" if the IFP did not participate in the election. 261 The
legitimacy of the new constitutional order required participation from

consume a transitional society. Id. Klug notes that "constitutional indeterminacy
plays a pivotal role in integrating competing forces." Id. at 7. Successful political
transition, according to Kug, requires legal systems that are indeterminate and
simultaneously definite in respect of the universe of viable political options. Id. at 7-8.
The indeterminacy of law facilitates political interaction, while the definitive nature of
political options provides order to the dialogue. Id.
258.
HOROWITZ, supra note 257, at 33-34.
Horowitz suggested several
structural arrangements that were not adopted in South Africa. See, e.g., id. at 204-05
(arguing for a separately elected president).
However, Horowitz's underlying
theoretical premise-that political institutions can be valuable tools in managing
regime-threatening conflicts-deserves recognition.
259.
THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 259-64.
260.
Id. at 259.
261.
Id. at 260.
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all major constituencies. 262 If the election proceeded without the IFP,
the new government would undoubtedly face violent resistance when
it tried to assert its authority within KZN. 263 The IFP, however,
refused to participate unless the new constitutional order would
recognize the Zulu Monarch and grant more autonomy to the
264
provinces.
The ANC, on the other hand, remained committed to a purely
democratic national constitution and would not provide ex officio
recognition of the Zulu Monarch. 265 Nevertheless, the ANC realized
that without the IFP's participation, the national constitution would
lack legitimacy within KZN and likely thrust South Africa into civil
war. 266 The ANC met with the IFP several times in an attempt to
gain IFP participation in the election, but the IFP's hegemonic
demands could not be satisfied. 267 Finally, just one week before the
election, the ANC was able to elicit the IFP's participation. 268 In
exchange for the IFP's involvement in the election, the ANC and the
269
NP agreed to amend the IC.
The amendments had two significant provisions, both of which
related to the constitutional powers of the provinces. 270
First,
provinces could create, via their constitutions, executive and
legislative structures and procedures that differed from the "default"

262.
Id.
263.
Indeed, the IFP's violent intentions were codified in its 1992 constitution,
which called for the creation of a provincial militia. That constitution also included a
provision stating that "federal" troops could not be stationed within the territory of
KZN absent the consent of the KZN legislature. See supra text accompanying notes
167-70. There were also reports of IFP troops in training during that period. See
AMATO, supranote 165, at 72.
264.
JUNG, supra note 91, at 77-78; MANDELA, supra note 1, at 535-36;
THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 259-62.
265.
MANDELA, supra note 1, at 536. Prior to meeting with the IFP in 1994,
Mandela told reporters, "I will go down on my knees to beg those who want to drag our
country into bloodshed and to persuade them not to do so." THOMPSON, supra note 16,
at 260.
266.
THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 261-62. The country's fragile state was
illustrated on March 28, 1994, when the thousands of IFP supporters staged a
demonstration in Johannesburg. Id. The mob brandished spears and "knoburries" and
marched towards the ANC headquarters at the "Shell House." Id. at 261. When the
crowd reached the Shell House, ANC security forces opened fire, killing more than fifty
people and injuring many more. Id.; see also MANDELA, supra note 1, at 537
(discussing the significance of the Shell House killings).
267.
See THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 259-61 (discussing these attempted
negotiations).
268.
Id. The IFP initially rejected the ANC's offer.
The NP and ANC
determined to go ahead with the election despite the absence of the IFP. The
government, however, prepared to subdue the IFP by force. A state of emergency was
declared in KZN, and troops were relocated to KZN. See id. at 261 (noting the
escalation of the violence).
269.
See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
270.
See id. (containing text of amendments).
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Second, provincial
provisions of the national constitution.
constitutions could provide for the "institution, role, authority and
status of a traditional monarch in the province, and shall make such
provision for the Zulu Monarch in the case of the province of
KwaZulu/Natal. ''2 71 The memorandum also included an agreement to
272
submit to international mediation for all "outstanding issues.
The structural creativity of that agreement is spectacular and
clearly evinces the political flexibility that subnational constitutions
can create within federal systems. The ANC, although not willing to
formally recognize the Zulu monarch in the national constitution,
used the national constitution to mandate that KZN draft a provincial
The
constitution that would recognize the Zulu monarch. 273
amendment created an asymmetry between the provinces that
pleased the IFP. The IFP could now look to the national constitution
to guarantee protection for the Zulu monarch-a substantial political
victory. 274 On the other hand, the ANC had conceded nothing of
substance, yet. A provincial constitution would still be required to go
through the provincial legislature where the ANC would have at least
some representation. Furthermore, even if the IFP could define the
role of the Monarch unilaterally at the provincial level, the document
would still have to be certified by the Court 275-a significant safeguard for the ANC.
Thus, the availability of subnational constitutions within South
Africa's structural framework enabled the IFP and the ANC to arrive
at a mutually acceptable agreement. That increased institutional
elasticity helped to lure the IFP into the election and secured the
universal legitimacy of South Africa's first democratically elected
government. Subnational constitutions provided a unique solution
that revealed to the IFP and the ANC that the new regime was
elastic enough to accommodate them both and represented a key

271.
Joint Statement Between President Mandela, F.W. de Klerk, & M.
Buthelezi, supra note 180.
Id.
272.
273.
This creates an interesting manipulation of constitutional "space." It is an
asymmetrical amendment. That is, it applies only to KZN. Furthermore, it is not
permissive "space." It is a mandate that the provincial constitution accommodate the
monarch; this mandate raises the interesting question of whether a KZN constitution
that did not accommodate the monarch would be found to be "inconsistent" with the IC
and thus un-certifiable by the Court.
274.
The IFP has frequently appealed to the April 19 Memorandum of
Agreement as the ANC's guarantee that the province would have a constitution. See,
e.g., Bheki ka Mncube, ANC Bitter of IFP Walkout, WITNESS (Pietermartizburg, S.
Afr.), May 16, 2005 (quoting IFP representative as stating, "[t]he issue of recognition of
the Zulu Monarch is not a political battle, but a duty and obligation as dictated by the
Sikhukhuze declaration [that paved the way for the IFP participation in the 1994
general election] and the country's 1996 constitution.") (alteration in original).
275.
S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 § 160(4).
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experience in successful political transformation.2 76
The 1994
election proceeded with astonishing tranquility. 2 77 Most importantly,
however, the new regime was implicitly ratified by all major
constituencies.
B. Managing Conflict by ProvidingAlternative PoliticalForums
South Africa offers one further example of the utility of
subnational constitutions in managing political conflicts. Scholars
have observed that democratization requires "participatory
processes" 278 that "encourage non-violent resolution of conflict. '279 In
particular, "participation in the constitution-making process is
essential in transitional justice because of the need to ensure that
previously excluded groups will not feel that the new rules have been
imposed by the main power holders but have instead emerged
through a participatory process. ' 28 0 Thus, successful political change
requires structural arrangements that will encourage participation
even by dissenting factions. Transitional government systems must
prevent political alienation by providing alternative opportunities for
legitimate participation.
The KZN experience illustrates the utility of subnational
constitutions in that regard. As already noted, after the 1994
election, the newly elected government began the process of revising
28 1
the IC so that a final and permanent constitution could be ratified.
In February 1995, the IFP took the position that, based on the April
19 agreement, the Constitutional Assembly could not continue in the
28 2
drafting process without submitting to international mediation.
The ANC denied that the April 19 agreement required international
mediation of that nature.
The IFP then walked out of the
Constitutional Assembly claiming that it had been tricked into

276. See Aeyal Gross, The Constitution,Reconciliation,and TransitionalJustice:
Lessons from South Africa and Israel, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 47, 58 (2004) ("Participation,
the sense of sharing in the endeavor, and the actual creation of a constitution, can
affect the reconciliation process and serve as building blocks of transitional justice.").
277. THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 263.
278. Samuels, supra note 257, at 670.
279. Id. at 665.
280. Gross, supra note 276, at 58.
281. JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 531; THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 269-70.
282.

JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 531.
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participation in the election. 28 3
The Constitutional Assembly
28 4
completed the NC without IFP participation.
The period immediately following the IFP withdrawal was
incredibly violent in KZN. 28 5 Chief Buthelezi called upon IFP
supporters to "fight for freedom" 28 6 and "rise and resist."28 7 The
ANC's response was swift and unflinching: the future legitimacy of
the constitution depended upon compliance with the procedures
outlined by the IC and, therefore, no party could be permitted to
"strong arm" the drafting process. 288 The threat of civil war was
28 9
again on the horizon.
However, the IFP immediately exercised the constitutional right
to draft a provincial constitution for KZN that it had secured through
the April 19 agreement.
The IFP considered the provincial
constitutional process to be a "surrogate for its participation in the
constitutional deliberations of the Constitutional Assembly" 290 and
undertook to use the provincial constitution as a means of indirectly
participating in the national constitutional debate. Following more
than a year of negotiation and increased violence, the two parties
unanimously agreed to a draft constitution on March 15, 1996.291
Notwithstanding the subsequent rejection of the constitution by the
Court, violence in the region dramatically and permanently subsided
292
since that date.

283.
Id. The IFP specifically cited to the agreement's terms on international
mediation, claiming that issues relating to the authority of the provinces should be
mediated. Id. The IFP claimed that its participation in the election had been premised
upon international mediation. Id. The ANC, however, was emboldened by the election
results and considered it the duty of the government to continue with the drafting
process. Id. at 531.
284.
Id. at 536; see also Devenish, supra note 187, at 513 (indicating that the
final constitution was certified by the Court in 1996); see In re Certification of the
Amended Text of the Const. of the Republic of S. Afr. 1997 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (certifying
the final constitution).
285.
JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 531.
286.
Id.
287.
Id.
288.
See id. at 531 ("If we [the ANCI allow the constitution to be written through
any body other than the Constitutional Assembly... we run the risk of bequeathing to
future generations in this country an illegitimate and undemocratic constitution.").
289.
Id. at 537. The ANC, during this period, uncovered a secret IFP document
outlining twenty points to provincial autonomy, which further enflamed the violence.
Id.
290.
Devenish, supra note 187, at 505; see also JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 61718 (recording Buthelezi as saying that it was the primary responsibility of the IFP to
promote federalism and for that reason "[o]ur provincial constitution must contain a
very clear statement outlining and detailing once and for all the demand for autonomy
of the people of this region").
291.
Devenish, supra note187, at 503.
292.
See Marks, supra note 86, at 183 ("One of the most paradoxical features of
the 'new' South Africa has been the virtual disappearance of political violence
associated with the Inkatha Freedom Party."); Bheki ka Mncube, KZN No Longer the
Strife Province, WITNESS (Pietermartizburg, S. Afr.), December 3, 2004.

2008]

AUTHORIZING SUBNA TIONAL CONSTITUTIONS

The significance of those events must not be overlooked. The
federal structure created by the IC provided an alternative yet
legitimate forum for the IFP to participate in political
transformation 293-the drafting of a provincial constitution. Absent
that legitimate forum, the IFP would have had no choice but to
surrender or violently oppose the new government. The provincial
constitution served as a political safety valve because it ensured that
fallout at the national level did not completely alienate the IFP from
the institutions of the new regime. 294 The availability of a provincial
constitution-making process enabled the IFP to abstain and
participate at the same time. In that sense, it ensured that the
ANC/IFP conflict remained within legitimate processes and
institutions. After walking out of the national deliberations, the IFP
focused all of its political energy on drafting a provincial constitution,
eventually resulting in a peaceful settlement with the ANC.
Conversely, the presence of a surrogate subnational
constitutional process emboldened the ANC to resist the
brinkmanship tactics of the IFP at the national level. The ANC could
not afford full-scale civil war. The legitimacy of the NC required
some form of participation from all of the regions within South Africa.
However, the ANC also could not give in to the IFP's substantive
demands at the national level because that too would undermine the
legitimacy of the NC. 295 Thus, the provincial constitution allowed the
ANC to remain consistent at the national level and flexible at the
provincial level.
Those dynamics almost certainly explain why the provincial
ANC representatives agreed to a document that was in obvious
conflict with the ANC's national policy. 296 President Mandela and
other national leaders were fully aware of the national significance of
the KZN constitution. 29 7 In fact, both Mandela and De Klerk put

293.
See supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing the IFP's clear
intention to utilize the provincial constitution-making process as an alternative to
participation in the national deliberations).
294.
Indeed, the IFP Secretary General at the time of the KZN drafting process
stated that the "promulgation of a provincial constitution . . . would provide the
institutional basis for the expression of provincial autonomy." KZN's New Constitution,
supra note 188, at 2. Thus, it seems that the IFP actually had a contemporaneous
understanding of the "institutional" role of the provincial constitution-making process
within South Africa's larger federal system.
295.
See supra note 288 and accompanying text (discussing this attempt to
"strong arm" the drafting process).
296.
The ANC formally appeared before the Court during the certification
hearing and opposed certification. KZN Certification1996 (11) BCLR 1419 (CC) 3 (S.
Afr.); Devenish, supranote 187, at 511-512.
297.
Devenish, supra note 187, at 511 n.47; see also id. at 506 n.17 ("President
Mandela, Deputy President F W de Klerk and the IFP President Mangosuthu
Buthelezi were continuously in telephonic communication with the negotiators in the
process."). Furthermore, renowned national negotiator, Pravin Gordhan, was sent to
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direct pressure on their respective parties to reach a compromise at
Consequently, an agreement was reached at the
all costs. 2 9 8
provincial level, the violence subsided, 299 and the legitimacy of the
3 00
national constitution was not questioned.
It is interesting that an early draft of the IC required provincial
constitutions to be approved by the Constitutional Assembly. 30 1 The
IFP adamantly opposed that qualification on provincial autonomy
and was successful in having it removed from the IC. 30 2 It was
replaced with the requirement that provincial constitutions be
certified by the Court. 30 3 Had the IC not been amended to create a
provincial drafting process that was insulated from the
Constitutional Assembly, the IFP may also have boycotted the
provincial process. The insulated provincial drafting process allowed
the IFP to attack the credibility of the Constitutional Assembly
A slight
without boycotting the entirety of the new regime.
alternation in South Africa's constitutional structure may have
resulted in an entirely different outcome and, more importantly,
complete alienation of the IFP from the transitional negotiations.
That plausible scenario illustrates the structural presence of
subnational constitutional allowances and the elasticity that they can
create within federal systems.
C. Mitigating Considerations
Lessons from the history of the KZN experience underscore the
utility of subnational constitutions in managing conflict. There are,
however, factors that perhaps mitigate the utility of subnational
constitutions in other federal arrangements. For instance, the IFP
was not only a minority party but a regional party. Minority parties
with less geographical centralization may not be as successful in
procuring concessions from central authorities, and subnational
constitutions may be inappropriate for subnational entities that are

KZN to facilitate an agreement. Id. at 506; KZN's New Constitution,supra note 188, at
10.
See KZN's New Constitution, supra note 188, at 10 (detailing the national
298.
interests involved in securing an all-inclusive provincial constitution).
Devenish, supra note 187, at 511.
299.
Indeed, in a recent attempt to draft a new constitution for the KZN, the IFP
300.
submitted a proposed draft. That draft constitution contained the following language:
"Subject to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, this Constitution shall be
the supreme law of the Province .... ." PROVINCE OF KwAZULU NATAL (Inkatha
Freedom Party Draft) CONST. 2004 § 8(3), available at http://www.ifp.org.za/
ConstitutionlprovKZNconstitution.htm.
SPITZ & CHASKALSON, supra note 180, at 161 (2000).
301.
Id. at 161-162.
302.
Id.
303.
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not geographically centralized.30 4 Additionally, the IFP was never
capable of completely overthrowing the national government by force.
That fact emboldened the ANC to call the bluff of the IFP when it
threatened secession.3 0 5 In a different federal system, where both
parties have an equal claim to national power, there is a reduced
likelihood that one party would accept a subnational constitutional
accommodation.
The South African experience does, however, reveal the
institutional utility of subnational constitutions.
They provide
alternative political forums and, therefore, provide means of
legitimate dissent during political transformation. Furthermore, they
create greater political flexibility. Parties can make concessions for
the sake of peace at the regional level that they cannot afford to make
at the national level. Constitution makers should take note of the
significant impact that subnational constitutions can have on
transitional politics. Subnational constitutions can provide powerful
alternatives in the contentious process of political transformation,
where creative solutions to conflicts can often mean the difference
between war and peace.

VI. SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND THE TRANSFORMATION

OF POLITICAL CULTURE

Successful political transformation, such as that experienced by
South Africa, requires not only flexible political institutions but also
an adjustment in political culture.30 6
Citizens, leaders, and
organizations must learn to participate appropriately in the new
political dispensation.3 0 7 However, the transformation of political
culture must be a reflexive process. That is, a new regime must

304.
For example, countries such as the Netherlands that employ
consociationalism-a form of federalism that divides power into non-territorial
subnational constituencies-may have less use for subnational constitutions during
transition.
See Charles E. Ehrlich, Democratic Alternatives to Ethnic Conflict:
Consociationalism and Neoseparatism, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 447, 457-58 (discussing

Lebanon's failed attempt at establishing a consociationalist system).
305.
Bouckaert, supra note 79, at 396; see MANDELA, supra note 1, at 616
(stating the ANC was committed to proceeding with the election even if the IFP failed
to participate).
306.
Samuels, supranote 257, at 667.
307.
Michel Rosenfeld, Constitution-Making, Identity Building, and Peaceful
Transition to Democracy: Theoretical Reflections Inspired by the Spanish Example, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 1891, 1894-95 (1998) ("[Rladical political transformation depends
on ... a move away from old habits and obsolete self-images for purposes of evolution
towards a new collective self-identity suited to the emergent political and institutional
order."); Samuels, supra note 257, at 667 ("Initiating changes to the political culture of
a society is one of the most difficult aspects of any post-conflict transition. It requires
substantial changes to behavior as well as to expectations and norms.").
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disseminate a political culture that will perpetuate itself;
simultaneously, the system must be able to accommodate the political
realities of the existent society. 30 8 The South African experience
illustrates that subnational constitutions can facilitate that reflexive
process by inducing political socialization and accommodating a
layered political identity that is suited to the realities of African
society.

A. Liberal Democracy and the Realities of African Society
Subnational constitutions have unique value in Africa. There is
a long-standing recognition that Africa struggles to maintain stable
in
democracies. 30 9 A significant shortcoming of liberal democracy 31
0
Africa is its "exaggerated focus on the autonomous individual.
Liberal democracy is centered on the rights and responsibilities of
individuals. 311 Citizenship is the most prized political status in
liberal democracy because it carries the promise of the full plethora of
legally protected rights, as well as the opportunity for full political
participation. 312 The political legitimacy of a liberal democracy is
derived from the individual citizen's exercise of his or her political
autonomy via the franchise. 313 Consequently, the political and
constitutional culture of most liberal democracies centers on the
individual, 314 and written constitutions are viewed as a means of

308.
See FRANCIS B. NYAMNJOH, AFRICA'S MEDIA, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICS
OF BELONGING 25-28 (2005) (discussing the need for democratic regimes to adapt to
the realities of their respective societies).
309.
Id. at 25-26 ("Implementing liberal democracy in Africa has been like
trying to force onto the body of a full-figured person, rich in all the cultural indicators
of health with which Africans are familiar, a dress made to fit the slim, de-fleshed
Hollywood consumer model of a Barbie-doll entertainment icon.").
Id. at 22; see also Adrien Katherine Wing, Communitarianism vs.
310.
Individualism:Constitutionalism in Namibia and South Africa, 11 WIS. INT'L L.J. 295,
306-07 (1993) (discussing the competing priorities that are resident in democratic
African countries).

311.

See Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject, 16

CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1056-60 (1994) (discussing constitutionalism and the
separation of the self and other).
Id.
312.
313.
In fact, liberal democracies are often skeptical of the political mobilization
of communities, such as religious organizations and interest groups, which are viewed
as a manipulation of the will of the people. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Other
Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843 (1993) (discussing the dangers of political
mobilization by religious affiliation).
314.
See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE-EVIDENCE § 5.3.3
(2002) ("In a liberal democracy, autonomy is or at least approaches an ultimate
value."). See generally GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY
(1988) (examining the nature and value of autonomy and analyzing various practical
moral issues).
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accommodating a diversity of individuals within one constitutional
31 5
society.
That framework is far too "parochial" for Africa's dynamic sense
of community. 316 Africans view themselves vis-A-vis a multitude of
communal relationships and expect recognition and political
representation not only as individuals, but as "cultural, religious and
The success of democracy in Africa,
regional communities." 317
therefore, may depend upon a "marriage or coexistence between
individual aspirations and community interests, since Africans
continue to emphasize relationships and solidarities over the illusion
of autonomy." 318 Stated differently:
For democracy to succeed in [the African] context, it must recognize the
fact that most Africans are primarily patriotic to their home village, to
which state and country in the modern sense are only secondary. It is
in acknowledging and providing for the reality of individuals who
straddle different forms of identity, and belonging, and who are willing
or forced to be both 'citizens' and 'subjects,' that democracy stands its
319
greatest chance in Africa.

That multi-layered approach to political identity cannot exist without
some mechanism for recognizing subnational units and identities. If
political identity in Africa is layered, governance and constitutionmaking must also be layered. Because written constitutions are tools
in the crafting of political identity, 320 African countries struggle to
accommodate the various layers of political identity in one central
Thus, African countries must provide legitimate
document. 321
instruments for subnational communities to express and codify their
political identities. Subnational constitutions and the subnational
constitution-making process can make that possible.

See Rosenfeld, supra note 311, at 1060 (describing constitutionalism as a
315.
means of accommodating diverse individuals and grounded upon philosophical theories
of individual autonomy).
316.
NYAMNJOH, supra note 308, at 21.
Id. See generally The Clash That Had To Come, supra note 89 (discussing
317.
South Africa's dilemma regarding the role of traditional leadership in government).
NYAMNJOH, supra note 308, at 26.
318.
Id.
319.
320.
See Rosenfeld, supra note 311, at 1060 ("Constitution making, moreover,
can be regarded as an attempt to . . . forge a common identity rooted in a common
text.").
See, e.g., Christina Murray & Catherine Maywald, Constitution-Making in
321.
Southern Sudan, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 1203, 1217-30 (2007) (discussing subnational
constitution-making in Sudan).
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B. The KZN Constitutionand the Layered Political Identity of Zulu
South Africans
KZN presents a superb illustration of the multiple layers of
African political identity.3 22 The fundamental source of disagreement
between the ANC and IFP was political identity. 32 3 The ANC was
always grounded in a broad, all-inclusive theory of African
nationalism that transcended tribal and hereditary loyalties. 324 The
ANC had no intention of eliminating traditional structures, but it
also had no desire to incorporate them into the political culture of the
new South Africa. 325 For the ANC, traditional leadership and
326
democratic government were separate and distinct spheres.
The IFP, however, was fundamentally concerned with the
political identity of the Zulu people. Strong provincial powers were
attractive to the IFP because they would create a means for the Zulu
people to protect their political identity. 327
A strong central
government was threatening to the IFP because it would not
recognize subnational communities.
The IFP saw a centralized
government as a death toll for the Zulu Monarch and broader cultural
sentiments of Zuluness.3 28 For the IFP, the new political culture
needed to recognize more than individual "South Africans," it had to
recognize Zulu South Africans.3 29
Provincial powers and the
authority to draft provincial constitutions were important to the IFP
because they were a means of legitimating the layered political
330
identity of Zulu South Africans.

322.
The differences between the ANC and the IFP represent the classic
distinctions between the modern citizen of a liberal democracy and the traditional
African subject. For a helpful extrapolation of those differences in relation to political
identity in post-apartheid South Africa, see DLAMINI, supra note 86, at 83-84.
323.
Id.; see supra note 85 (discussing the contention that the IFP's concern for
Zulu identity was disingenuous). See generally The Clash that had to Come, supra note
89 (describing the IFP and ANC's competing visions).
324.
See The Clash that had to Come, supra note 89 (discussing the ANC's
theory).
325.
See DLAMINI, supra note 86, at 84 ("[A] pressing issue for the ANC, then,
was how to deal with ethnic rights in the face of an imagined non-ethnic community.").
326.
See The Clash that tad to Come, supra note 89, at 11 (providing a detailed
description of the IFP and ANC's competing visions of ethnicity in the new
constitutional order).
327.
Id. at 54-55. This took the form of advocating for the recognition of
traditional leadership in the new constitutional order. Id. The role of the "chiefs" and
the Zulu monarch has been the centerpiece of the IFP's platform. Id.
328.
See JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 607 (quoting Chief Buthelezi as saying,
"[The ANC] is [an] evil at work which wants to destroy amakhosi [traditional leaders]
and the autonomy of traditional communities to enable the central government in
Pretoria to control every level of government and exercise its political influence right
across the land").
329.
Id. at 604-09.
330.
Id. at 617-22.
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The April 19 agreement illustrates the importance of political
identity to the IFP and the utility of subnational constitutions in
memorializing political identity. The primary significance of the
agreement was that it ensured that the Zulu Monarch would have a
place in the new political dispensation. The details of how the
Monarch would be accommodated were yet to be determined, but the
IFP had elicited a constitutional guarantee that the traditional
leadership of the Zulu people would be incorporated into the new
constitutional order. As has already been mentioned, that concession
was only viable through the mechanism of a subnational constitution
because the ANC could not afford to make such a concession via the
NC. 331 Because the substantive content of provincial constitutions
was otherwise very limited by the NC, the KZN constitution became,
primarily, a means of symbolically memorializing Zulu political
332
identity.

C. PoliticalSocialization in TransitionalAfrican States
Although democratic systems must evolve to accommodate the
realities of African society, those societies must also change and
embrace certain democratic principles. Citizens and institutions
must recalibrate their political identity so they can participate
appropriately in the new constitutional order. 333 The success of a new
constitutional order depends on whether a society is able to abandon,
at least to a degree, an old political identity and assume a new
constitutional status. 334 Citizens must, for example, value and trust
the franchise-a counterintuitive notion for patriarchal and
communal societies. Thus, political transformation requires citizens
and institutions to be politically socialized.

331.
See supra Part IV.A (discussing the accommodation of a subnational
constitution for the KZN).
332.
Interestingly, the province has not secured a constitution so far. However,
the anomalous relationship between traditional leadership and democracy continues to
be the main impediment to the adoption of a provincial constitution. In KZN's most
recent attempt to adopt a provincial constitution, the status of the monarch was a
contentious issue. See Bheki ka Mncube, Monarchy to Dominate KZN Constitution
Talks, WITNESS (Pietermartizburg, S. Afr.), May 3, 2005. Ultimately, after multiple
public hearings and various committee meetings, the IFP boycotted the ANC-led
process because of issues relating to traditional leadership. See Bheki ka Mncube, IFP
Walks Out of Constitutional Committee, WITNESS (Pietermartizburg, S. Mr.), Apr. 12,
2005; Bheki ka Mncube, Monarchy to Dominate KZN Constitution Talks, WITNESS
(Pietermartizburg, S. Afr.), May 3, 2004; see also supra note 255 (discussing the 2004
KZN constitution).
333.
Rosenfeld, supra note 307, at 1895-96.
334.
Id. at 1895.
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Political socialization "is the process of induction into a political
culture." 335 It involves the training of citizens in respect of the
mechanics, values, and "authoritative outputs" of a political
system. 336
In second- or third-generation government systems,
political socialization usually occurs as part of the individual
In those societies, schools, family and
maturation process. 337
religious associations, political parties, and local communities are the
338
primary disseminators of political culture.
However, socialization during periods of political transition
occurs under exigent circumstances. 33 9 Transitional societies must
acclimate an entire generation of adult leaders and citizens almost
instantaneously. Additionally, in transitional societies, pre-existing
institutions may actually impede socialization if they reinforce
3 40
attitudes and principles that undermine the new political order.
Africa compounds the difficulties associated with disseminating
political culture because of disparities in education, limited access to
information, and a general lack of resources. 341 Thus, in young
African democracies, government is not only a provider of essential

335.
Gabriel A. Almond, A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics, in
APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF POLITICS 209, 233 (Bernard Susser ed., 1992); see also
Peter J. Cannon, The Third Balkan War and Political Disunity: Creating a
Confederated Cantonal Constitutional System, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 373, 406
(1996) ("Political socialization occurs by perpetuating cultures and institutions over a
temporal continuum which tends to induct a person into a 'citizenship' role.").
336.
Almond, supra note 335, at 233.
337.
See id. at 232-33 (describing the political socialization process in terms of
an individual's natural maturation); Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 431 ("The survival of our constitutional polity ultimately depends on the proper
cultivation of children's 'hearts and minds."').
338.
Almond, supra note 335, at 232-34.
339.
Rosenfeld, supra note 307, at 1892 ("[T]o the extent . . . that successful
constitution-making depends on replacing an incompatible pre-constitutional identity
with a more congenial collective self-image, the new constitutional framework could
prove too destabilizing to allow the polity to rally sufficiently around the requisite
common identity.").
South Africa's experience with traditional leadership and customary law
340.
presents a perfect example in that regard. The conflict has been summarized thusly:
The terms of democratic discourse which [will] henceforth dominate South
African politics [are] hostile to the hereditary, patriarchal and personal
principles of traditional leadership. Even where traditional leadership could
make some claim to be responsible for the communities they administer, this
[is] not on the basis of electoral competition, which again violate[s] the
democratic standards of the new South Africa.
The Clash that had to Come, supra note 89, at 11. Institutions of traditional leadership
therefore present an impediment to the fundamental assumptions and guarantees of
liberal democracy. Id.
341.
See NYAMNJOH, supra note 308, at 22-23 ("Remote from the information
superhighway or the global village and peripheral to the centralized activities of their
own government, rural inhabitants of Africa are susceptible to manipulation by
reactionary and revolutionary elites alike.").
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services but also the primary instrument of political socialization.
Consequently, the success of transitional African democracies
depends on whether those governments can find creative ways to
educate citizens on the values and mechanics of democratic
governance.
Subnational constitution-making can bring democratic principles
to a regional level and induce valuable political participation from
citizens. Transitional governments that permit or require regional
units to engage in constitution-making can elicit political
participation from citizens and institutions that would not otherwise
have an opportunity or an interest in government. Additionally, as
illustrated in South Africa, subnational constitution-making can
facilitate constructive involvement even of dissenting political
groups. 3 4 2
Most important, however, the value of subnational
constitution-making in those instances is not the resultant document
but the interaction and participation that the possibility of a
constitution can induce.
D. PoliticalSocialization and the KZN Constitution-MakingProcess
The move from apartheid to democracy thrust South Africans
into an entirely new political culture that was characterized by
equality, liberty, and republican government. The success of that
new dispensation, however, would depend on whether the citizenry
and leadership would assume their new role in society.3 43 It was
imperative that the transitional system train citizens and leaders to
3 44
participate appropriately in a democratic society.
South Africa's political parties, for example, were constituted
around the political landscape of the apartheid regime. The ANC was
primarily a liberation party, the IFP was an apartheid-era ethnic and
cultural party, and the NP was an almost exclusively white-based
party. 345 For democracy to function, those entities would need to
reconstitute themselves in accordance with the new political system.
It was necessary for them to develop platforms and identities that
furthered democracy, rather than frustrate the new regime by
perpetuating the vestiges of apartheid. The KZN constitutionmaking process facilitated that socialization by bringing the
institutions and procedures of constitutional democracy to KZN

342.
See supra Part IV.B (discussing the KZN constitution-making process as an
instrument of dissent for the IFP).
343.
See supra Part V.B; see also Rosenfeld, supra note 307, at 1894-95
(discussing that radical political transformation requires a move towards a new
collective self-identity).
344.
Rosenfeld, supra note 307, at 1894-95.
345.
See Jenkins, supra note 16, at 476-79, 483-84 (discussing the
constituencies and platforms of the IFP, NP, and ANC).
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notwithstanding the IFP's withdrawal from the national constitutionmaking process.
The KZN constitutional process facilitated the transformation of
the IFP from a hegemonic, ethnically based organization into a bone
fide opposition political party.34 6 The IFP's withdrawal from the
Constitutional Assembly seriously threatened the legitimacy of the
national constitution-making process. The IFP retained the ability to
destabilize KZN and appeared determined to do so because of
dissatisfaction with the ANC's unwillingness to submit to
international mediation. As long as the IFP remained on the
"outside" of the transitional government, the transition to a stable
democracy would be threatened-or, at the very least, the legitimacy
of the new dispensation would be undermined within KZN. 347
The IFP knew that the IC severely limited the province's
"constitutional space" 348 and that the substance of the KZN draft
constitution would be in violation of the IC.
However, the IC
provided procedures by which a province could adopt a constitution
and submit it to the Court, regardless of its substantive content. 349
Those institutional allowances provided a legitimate venue from
which the IFP could protest and even challenge the national process
without directly attacking its legitimacy.
More important, the IFP implicitly endorsed the new
constitutional order by choosing to protest in that way. The IC's
allowance for subnational constitutions ensured that even when the
IFP was outside of the national debate, it was still using a legitimate
constitutional apparatus. In drafting a provincial constitution, the
IFP was acting through representatives elected in accordance with
procedures established by the IC. 350 Further, in submitting the
document to the Court, the IFP implicitly recognized the Court's
authority and, by extension, the legitimacy of the constitution
creating the Court. Thus, the IFP was assimilated into the new
constitutional regime, at least in part, by its participation in the KZN
35 1
drafting process.

346.
See LODGE, supranote 78, at 156 (discussing some of the contemporary and
legitimate policy disagreements between the ANC and IFP).
347.
See supra Part V.B.
348.
See Williams & Tarr, supra note 24, at 15-16 (defining the term
"constitutional space"); see also supraPart L.A (discussing the same).
349.
S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 § 160.
350.
The IFP did threaten to dissolve the provincial legislature and to hold a
new election if the constitution was not approved by the ANC, but it never acted on
that threat. JEFFERY, supra note 13, at 617.
351.
The significance of this observation becomes clear when one focuses on the
distinction between substance and process. The IFP knew and intended the substance
of the KZN constitution to be ultra vires and declared invalid by the Court. Indeed, the
IFP's chief motivation was to draft a constitution that embodied its opposition to the
national deliberations. However, the process by which the constitution was drafted
was dictated entirely by the IC, and the IFP complied with those procedures, even to
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The 1996 drafting process was also valuable because it mirrored
the national drafting process, thus exposing the IFP and its
constituency to the ideas and mechanisms of constitutional
democracy. During both the national deliberations 352 and the initial
stages of the provincial constitution-making process, the IFP
demonstrated that it was ill-prepared to function in the new
regime. 353
It exhibited an inappropriate hegemonic mentality,
refusing to accept compromise solutions and threatening to resort to
violence unless its demands were met. 354 That mentality was
understandable, however, because the IFP had no experience with
multi-party governance. 3 55 Under apartheid, it had never been
necessary for the IFP to engage in coalition building, bargaining, or
political compromise.
However, the 1996 KZN drafting process forced the IFP to
confront the political realities of the new order. The KZN parliament
was a multi-party institution that represented the interests of all
citizens of KZN, irrespective of ethnic origin. Consequently, the IFP
did not have the majority vote necessary to adopt a constitution
unilaterally. 356 The intense political maneuvering that occurred
during the drafting process was invaluable training for the IFP
because it forced the IFP to reckon with the realities of the new
order. 357 Indeed, the IFP now fashions itself as a multi-ethnic
political party and has tried to articulate a policy-based platform in
opposition to the ANC. 358
By all accounts, the IFP has been
successfully assimilated into the constitutional order. The KZN

the point that they submitted the text to the Court knowing it would be voided. The
key observation from the South African experience is that South Africa's transitional
federal structure created processes and institutions whereby dissenting groups could
dissent and participate at the same time. That accommodation created the possibility
that the IFP would be assimilated into the new order, ironically, by its act of dissent.
352.
See supra Part' III.A (discussing the IFP withdrawal from the
Constitutional Assembly).
353.
See supra notes 209-17 and accompanying text (discussing the IFP's
sabotage of the Fernhill Agreement and the IFP's inability to develop a coalition with
the minority parties).
354.
Id.
355.
See MANDELA, supra note 1, at 576 (discussing how, during apartheid, the
IFP was the only recognized black political party within South Africa and KZN, the
only black political party that was not banned during apartheid); see also TRADITIONAL
DICTATORSHIP, supra note 13, at 3 (discussing how IFP was the only political party to
gain representation in the parliament of the KwaZulu homeland); supra notes 112-14
and accompanying text (discussing the IFP's popularity under apartheid).
356.
See supra note 191 (providing the complete results of the 1994 provincial
election, with the IFP holding the most seats but not having a simple or super
majority).
In fact, the ANC noted at the end of the negotiations that the constitutional
357.
process proved "once and for all that the two rival parties could co-operate." JEFFERY,
supra note 13, at 540.
358.
See LODGE, supranote 78, at 156 (discussing some of the contemporary and
legitimate policy disagreements between the ANC and IFP).
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constitution-making process was an essential instrument in that
assimilation.

VII. CONCLUSION

The availability of subnational constitutions has immense utility
within unstable and transitional federal states. The KZN narrative
illustrates that authorizing subnational units to adopt constitutions
can increase the elasticity of the overall federal system. Specifically,
the South African experience demonstrates that federal systems are
better equipped to manage regime-threatening conflicts if they permit
constituent units to adopt constitutions. Additionally, subnational
constitution-making processes can contribute to the dissemination of
political culture by facilitating constructive political interaction.
South Africa's miraculous transition to democracy bears testament to
the unique virtues of authorizing subnational constitutions within
transitional and unstable federal states-a lesson that should inform
contemporary constitution- making and transitional governments.

